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ABSTRACT PAGE
This thesis intends to challenge conventional historical understandings of the political leadership
of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania by placing them in comparison,
specifically in the key early post-independence period of 1960-1979. It examines points of
convergence and contrast in their rises to power, their methods of leadership, and their
ideological and pragmatic modes of executing the power of the state. It also demonstrates how
the contexts from which each man emerged, both personally and within the nation, played a
crucial role in their respective ascensions to power and subsequent leadership played out, and,
by proxy, how the trajectories of each nation were set in place by these processes.
The thesis focuses on the period from 1960-1979 preceded by introductory biographical sketches
of each man. The first section of this thesis briefly contextualizes the national and personal
histories which are at the center of the project. The second section focuses on deployments of
language in each nationalization project. The third section addresses the construction and
implementation of ideologically important documents in each context. The final section analyses
Mobutu and Nyerere's respective relationships with the U.S. government during the early stages
of the Angolan conflict.
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Introduction
I saw that old Father Nile without any doubt rises in the Victoria N'yanza, and, as
I had foretold, that lake is the great source of the Holy River which cradled the
first expounder of our religious belief.
—John Hanning Speke1
Passing thence to the south ... Cao become soon aware that he was approaching a
large river, for when still 5 leagues out at sea... he found the water fresh, by no
means an exaggeration, for islands of floating vegetation coining out of the Congo
have been encountered 100 miles from its mouth, and 9 miles to seaward the
surface water is quite fresh.
. 2
— Ernest George Ravenstein

Maji huteremka bondeni,hayapandi mlima.
Water must flow into the low places, for it cannot climb up the hill.
As it bisects the African continent the equator crosses two of the world's great
bodies o f water: the Congo River and Lake Victoria. These waters have long sustained
the lives of millions of Africans, and captured the fancy of the first European explorers to
encounter them—people like Diogo Cao, Henry Morton Stanley and John Speke. Artists
from the author Joseph Conrad to filmmaker John Huston have found inspiration in these
bodies o f water.4 The Congo River is one of the most powerful rivers on the planet,
pulling water from countless tributaries that drain the immense Congo rainforest basin.
Over 900 miles upriver from where the river disgorges itself violently into the Atlantic

1 John H anning Speke, Journal o f the discovery o f the source o f the Nile, (London: J.M. Dent &, 1908),
429.
2 Ernest George Ravenstein, The voyages o f Diogo Cao and Bartholom eu Dias: 1482 - 88 (London: Royal
Geographic Society, 1908), 5.
3 A Swahili methali, or proverb, translated by the author. As with many Swahili proverbs this methali
contains shared wisdom, and the origin o f it lies in oral tradition, thus the “original” author is unknown.
4 Huston's "The African Queen" was filmed on location on the Congo River in 1951.
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lies a small town called Lisala.5 Still a sleepy backwater, Lisala's most famous product is
Mobutu Sese Seko, bom Joseph-Desiree Mobutu in 1930. Lake Victoria, the source of
Nile and thus one of the most important transnational natural resources in the world, is
also the largest tropical lake on the planet.6 On its southeastern bank lies the small
community o f Butiama, also famous for its own native son, Julius Nyerere, born
Kambarage Nyerere in 1922.
Like many others on the continent both Mobutu and Nyerere had a connection to
the waters of Africa beyond just physical sustenance. Nyerere’s mother was renowned for
her spiritual power to help summon the rains, and named Nyerere after a spirit of
lightning which she said presided over his birth— a night pervaded by a furious
thunderstorm.7 Mobutu possessed a “visceral love of the water” his entire life, and
routinely built homes on the banks of great bodies of water.8 In contrast to the power of
these waters were the men’s inauspicious home towns, each beside these marvels of
nature. Each came from families without colonial connections, and from ethnic groups on
the margins of national society without any significant political power base to mobilize,
and yet these men emerged from these beginnings to dominate the politics of east and

5 It is now known that the Congo is the second most voluminous river, after the Amazon, on the planet.
However, even at the time o f its European “discovery” by Diogo Cao, the explorer was stunned to find
detritus from the river ejected several miles into the Atlantic. A ccording to the Smithsonian M agazine (see
full citation in the conclusion) the Congo flows at “ 1.25 m illion cubic feet o f water per second.”
6 F. Witte et al., "Species extinction and concomitant ecological changes in Lake Victoria," Netherlands
Journal o f Zoology 42, no. 2-3 (1991): 214.
7 Shirley Graham Du Bois, Julius K. Nyerere: Teacher o f Africa (New York: Julian M essner, 1975), 17.
8 M ichela Wrong, In the Footsteps o f Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink o f D isaster in M obutu's Congo (New
York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 71. Even his homes in Europe tended to be built near water, such as his
villa on the French Riviera.
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central Africa for more than three decades. Today, the Congo River and Lake Victoria
bear witness to the multiple legacies left Nyerere and Mobutu on Tanzania and the DRC.9
The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania emerged from the colonial
period with two markedly different national contexts.10 Tanzania’s bloodless
independence struggle produced one clear choice for head of state: Julius Nyerere,
moving into independence at the head of his highly mobilized, multi-ethnic Tanganyikan
Africa National Union party. Educated in Scotland and Uganda11, brilliant, philosophical
and calm, Nyerere’s rise to national leadership was predetermined with colonial officials
and peaceful, but would not have been possible without sustained political pressure and
grassroots organization on the part of the Tanzanian populace. 12
By contrast, the abrupt Belgian withdrawal from the Congo was marked by
violence and chaos, and a severe lack o f premeditation. Only 26 Congolese in a
population of over thirty million had completed post-secondary education by
independence in 1960.

1 'X

Ethnically aligned political leaders like Joseph Kasa-Vubu and

Moise Tshombe vied for control of the nation during the Congo Crisis of 1960-61, and
the elected president, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated within his first year in office.

9 For the sake o f coherence, 1 will use the term “Congo” for the state called variously the Congo Free State
from 1885, the Belgian Congo in 1908, the Dem ocratic Republic o f the Congo in 1960, Zaire in 1967, and
then again in 2007, the Democratic Republic o f the Congo. “Tanzania” will be used instead o f Tangayika,
except where the distinction is relevant to provide context.
10 Zaire in 1960 and Tanzania in 1963.
11 At M akerere University in K am pala and the University of Edinburgh.
12 For example see 1. N. Kimambo and A. J. Temu, A History o f Tanzania (Nairobi: East African
Publishing House, 1969), 209. Nyerere's push to the U.N. for independence form ally began in 1955 through
a direct appeal to end trusteeship and place pow er in the hands of indigenous political groups.
13 Barbara A. Yates, "Structural Problems in Education in the Congo (Leopoldville),"Comparative
Education Review 7, no. 2 (O ctober 1963): 159.
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Foreign powers, especially the United Nations, United States, and the Soviet Union, in
the fervor of the Cold War, attempted to control Congolese proxies who in turn attempted
to manipulate their supposed puppeteers. Out of this maelstrom emerged an unlikely
leader: a man who had not completed secondary school, achieved power through
establishing client networks within the military, and had no major ethnic base to
consolidate his leadership. In light of these political challenges, Joseph-Desiree Mobutu,
despite intense support from the United States, seemed destined to be, within a short
time, another victim of Congo’s exceptionally bloody political history. This, of course,
would not be so. Thirty years later both men were still major forces in their respective
nation’s politics, but were in the twilight of their influence.14 Their legacies today,
however, are as divergent as were the conditions of their emergence into national
leadership. Julius Nyerere’s beatification to sainthood in the Catholic Church and
informal veneration by Tanzanians and others around the world is ongoing.15 By
contrast, many still vilify Mobutu, blaming him in part for the world’s deadliest conflict
since World War II which continues in the Congo, ignited in the wake of his violent fall
from power.16
These preponderant perspectives are not universal. Ali Mazrui famously critiqued
what he called a “Tanzaphilia” among western Africanists, eager to see the very best in
Nyerere’s ideals and implementations because of Nyerere’s intellectual ability, his pan-

14 N yerere stepped down from the presidency in J 985, but remained chairman o f the party in power, Chama
Cha M apinduzi, until 1990.
1'"'Robert Mugagga, "Yes, Nyerere Could M ake a Great Saint!" The Observer (Kampala), O ctober 29, 2009.
16 Brennan, Richard. M ortality in the D em ocratic Republic o f Congo. Report. New York: International
Rescue Committee, 2008.
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Africanism, and his moderate leftism.17 Mobutu, also, has been written off too often in
academic critique, and many scholars have allowed the kleptocratic aspect of his regime
to overshadow any possible ideological contributions made by his regime to Zairian
. .

consciousness and regional politics.

1 ft

^

Despite this, scholars such as Crawford Young and

Thomas Turner suggest that M obutu’s idea of “authenticite,” initially at least, was an
effective, popular, and ideologically interesting political construct, with “genuine
resonance” and power.19 Indeed, the common wisdom that Mobutu was a puppet for
American interests in Africa is also due for challenge. An ex-U.S. ambassador to Zaire,
for example, recognized that Mobutu was “an extraordinary political animal” and
ultimately admitted that Mobutu had far more influence and power in the bilateral
relationship than the United States.20
A reason for these complex views of each man is that they can be seen to
represent a category of Africa's first generation of independent leaders. Nyerere is
prototypical of what Toyin Falola calls a “small elite of political theorists who doubled as
political leaders.” These were well educated, ideologically committed
statesmen/intellectuals— men like Ghana’s Kwame Nkurumah, Zambia’s Kenneth
Kaunda and Senegal’s Leopold Senghor. 2 1 Mobutu represents leaders who acquired

17 Ali A. M azrui, "Tanzaphilia," Transition 75/76 (1997).
18 Exam ples include In the Footsteps o f Mr. K urtz by journalist M ichela Wrong, cited frequently in this
book, C h ief O f Station, Congo by former CIA station chief Larry Devlin, and M obutu or Chaos by M ichael
G. Schatzberg.
19 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and D ecline o f the Zairian State (M adison: U niversity o f
W isconsin Press, 1985), 220.
20 Elise F. Patcher, "Our Man in Kinshasa: U.S. relations with Mobutu, 1970-1983; Patron-Client relations
in the international sphere " (diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 321. The am bassador is not named in
Patcher's dissertation, and the quotation is attributed to "Informant 32."
21 Toyin Falola, Nationalism a n d African Intellectuals (Rochester, N.Y.: University o f Rochester Press,
2000), 27. Falola also includes “Ndamdi Azikiwe o f Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta o f K enya... Sekou Toure o f
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power through control of the military, autocrats who ruled through repression and left
power in disgrace through violence. Sadly, Mobutu-like leaders are plentiful in modem
African history, including men like C.A.R.’s Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Somalia’s Siad Barre,
and Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam.22 This thesis intends to challenge these macro
categories of African leadership through placing Mobutu and Nyerere in comparison,
specifically in the key period of 1960-1979. This project does not intend to elevate
Mobutu, or denigrate Nyerere, but rather intends to examine points of convergence and
contrast in their rises to power, their methods of leadership, and their ideological and
pragmatic modes of executing the power of the state. Finally, this thesis intends to
demonstrate how the contexts from which each man emerged, both personally and within
the nation, played a crucial role in how each man's rise to power and subsequent
leadership played out, and, by proxy, how the trajectories of each nation were set in place
by these processes.
Comparing these particular leaders also proves valuable because their states’
affairs have long been entangled geographically, politically and in terms of the
trajectories of leadership. The nations share physical proximity— Lake Tanganyika is a
common border. 23 The historical timelines of Mobutu and Nyerere's lives and periods of

Guinea, and Felix H ouphouet-Boigny o f Cote d ’Ivoire” in this group. O f these, Sekou Toure certainly
could have a place on the list included above, but his predilection for secret prisons and reports o f many
hundreds m urdered during his time in pow er cloud his worthiness on a list o f A frica’s most auspicious
statesmen.
22 It is worth noting how closely these men adhere to the “M obutu pattern.” Bokassa, Barre and M ariam all
entered the military as low level officers, seized pow er during chaos generated by a pow er vacuum,
consolidated power under one party, and eventually were forced out of power through military action after
overseeing brutally repressive regimes for many years. M engistu has also been connected to Nyerere
because o f his forced villigization process intended to nationalize farming, but the level o f oppression and
repression he utilized in this process dwarfs any used in N yerere’s Tanzania.
2j The Lake Tanganyika border is alm ost three hundred miles long, and at its most narrow points is under
25 miles wide.
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power are remarkably similar. Each rose to power in the early days of African
independence, and solidified their power and national boundaries from 1960-1963. Each
spent three years consolidating power internally, from 1964-1966, and then crafted
defining documents regarding the course of each nation in 1967. Each saw their nations
and national visions largely thrive until key points in the mid-70s when several factors,
both internal and external, set each nation on a downward trajectory in terms of economic
development, political freedom, and cultural expansion. This scope, from 1960-1979, is
the period examined in this thesis, with introductory biographical sketches of each man.
The first section of this thesis briefly contextualizes the national and personal histories
which are at the center o f the project. The second section focuses on the use of language
in each nationalization project. The third section addresses the construction and
implementation of ideologically important documents in each context. The final section
analyses Mobutu and Nyerere's respective relationships with the U.S. government during
the early stages of the Angolan conflict, which saw a post-colonization Angola serve as
proxy hot war between Cubans and Soviets against the United States and continental
allies. 24

24 The A ngolan Civil W ar begin in 1975 after it gained independence from Portugal and continued until the
death o f U N ITA ’s Jonas Savimbi in 2002.
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Part I. Establishing Context
In order to effectively contextualize the comparison at the center of this thesis, it
is important to briefly examine the development of the states of Congo and Tanzania, and
then to sketch out the biographical details o f each leader up to 1960, the beginning of the
period examined more closely in the rest of the paper. The states that are now Tanzania
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo share the same infamous birth year: 1885.
This was the penultimate year of the Conference of Berlin, where the European powers
arbitrarily parceled out Africa for economic exploitation, political experimentation, and
resource extraction. 25 To the residents of these newly minted nations, little would change
for over a decade, and even then a new history of resistance and proto-independence
would emerge, but in the imaginations of the cartographers of Europe the African
continent was to be forever transformed.
Colonial Congo
King Leopold II of Belgium had been laying groundwork for the acquisition of the Congo
Free State since at least 1876, almost a decade prior to the Conference of Berlin. 26
Leopold’s audacious plan was to gain for himself personally— not as the titular head of
the state o f Belgium— an economically bountiful region almost seventy seven times the
size of his own nation. 27 Leopold recognized in the Congo the potential for massive
mineral extraction, agriculture, and saw in its mass a space for a tiny nation to engage in
large projects, impossible in the metropole. He also knew that Belgium needed to take its

2:1 Thomas P ackenhanrs The Scram ble fo r Africa is an excellent account o f this process.
26 Georges N zongola-N talaja, The Congo: From L eopold to Kabila: A People's H istory (London: Zed
Books, 2002), 15.
27 Belgium is ju st under 1 1,800 square miles and Congo is over 905,000 square miles.

place in Africa for reasons of prestige and influence, the colonization of Africa quickly
became a status project as well as brimming with economic potential. He knew from the
outset that he needed strong public support in from the Belgian people, international
humanitarian groups and other national powers, especially Britain, France and Germany,
for his African project. One method he used to generate this was by enlisting the famous
explorer, Henry Morton Stanley, to chart the area around the Congo River and extract
treaties from chiefs in the region. At the Conference of Berlin, Leopold’s near decade of
intense politicking paid off, and using Stanley's reports and treaties as evidence of the
righteousness of his claims he was granted by the conference delegates a massive land
grant— the size of Western Europe— in Africa as a “humanitarian venture” under his
supervision. 28 The outcomes o f this “humanitarian venture” are well known, revealed
especially powerfully by journalist Adam Hochshild in King Leopold’s Ghost. Despite
his success in convincing the world to adopt his plan for Central Africa, the economic
viability o f the Free State was by no means a foregone conclusion. However, rubber,
newly adapted for commercial use, proved the engine of financial gain which justified
economically Leopold’s massive gamble, but the extraction of the sap from the rubber
vine cryptostegia grandiflora proved highly deadly to the people of the “Free State,”
events described well by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja as "the Congo holocaust." 29 After
Leopold’s 23 year period of rule, Congo lost approximately half of its population to the
unimaginable utilizations of violence under the Force Publique,— Leopold’s military

"’8 N zongola-N talaja, The Congo, 16.
29 Ibid., 18.
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force— disease and massive displacement.30 The grotesque violence achieved its
economic purpose, however: estimates suggest Leopold extracted approximately $1.1
billion of raw materials, adjusted for inflation, during his reign over the Free State.

31

Activists like E. D. Morel and George Washington Williams, missionaries like
William Sheppard, and authors like Joseph Conrad and Mark Twain brought the
atrocities being committed in Congo to world attention, and in 1908 Leopold lost control
of the Congo to the state of Belgium.32 The Belgian government itself did not pressure
Leopold to relinquish the state—he always imagined "grandly bequeathing" Congo to his
people— but he did not wish for the transfer of power to be impelled by humiliation and
international condemnation.33 This time, however, Leopold did not get his wish.
Belgium reluctantly took control of the state, having nothing like the economic
capacity of Britain to fund the expenses of colonial experimentation. For this reason, the
Belgian government maintained the system of exploitive and regressive governance
Leopold had established, albeit with the whitewash of a “constitution” overseeing
political practices.34 They also followed in the trajectory of their monarch by brutally
exploiting the region for Belgian economic benefit while expending the bare minimum
effort on humanitarian or “civilizing” projects. Thus, by the time domestic pressure from

30 Ibid., 22. The 1911 census recorded 8.5 million Congolese, and the estimates taken by Leopold when he
came into possession o f the Free State indicated betw een 20 and 30 m illion people.
31 Adam Hochschild, K ing Leopold's Ghost a Story o f Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial
H//7cr/(Boston: H oughton Mifflin, 1999), 277.
32 C onrad’s book is the fam ous H eart o/D arkness, and T w ain’s book on the subject was K ing L eo p o ld ’s
Soliloquy.
33 Hochschild, King Leopold's G host, 257.
34 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 27.
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Congolese dissidents, and the rising tide of African independence movements across the
continent, overcame the rickety Belgian colonial apparatus, what was handed over to the
Congolese was, in the words of Patrice Lumumba, “a regime of injustice, suppression and
exploitation.”35

Colonial Tanzania
In 1885 when European powers granted Leopold the right to attempt to conquer
the area that became the Congo Free State, the fourteen-year-old nation of Germany
received a number of African territories as well, including what was called Tanganyika
and the state of Ruanda-Urundi combined into a region called German East Africa. The
German Empire's Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s reasons for acquiring holdings in East
Africa have been characterized by John Iliffe as “obscure.”36 Bismarck appeared to think
it would be “very simple” to gain territory in East Africa: “for a few muskets one can
obtain a paper with some native crosses,” he observed.37 This proved to be anything but
the case, and widespread rebellions, most notably the Maji-Maji rebellion in 1905,
shattered German expectations of ruling a simple, docile populace in East Africa. The
Germans were never able to ignite rapid economic growth in Tanganyika, and gold
mining, later a major component of the Tanzanian economy, did not begin until 1909.
Likewise, the Gennans were not able to consolidate enough labor to make any large scale
industry viable due to Tanzania's relatively low population density.

3:1 As quoted in Sean Kelly, Am erica's Tyrant (Lanham, Md.: Am erican University Press, 1993), 16.
36 John Iliffe, A M odern H istory o f Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 89.
37 Quoted in Iliffe, A M odern H istory o f Tanganyika, 90.
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In the aftermath o f World War I, and Bismarck’s loss to the allies, the League of
Nations designated colonies formerly held by the Germans as "trustee" territories which
would be administered by various Allied states. Tanganyika fell into the "trusteeship" of
the United Kingdom.

oo

Unlike Congo under Leopold, Tanganyika had not been a highly

successful economic project for the Germans. Neither country possessed large scale
agricultural projects, and Tanganyika had nothing like the nascent copper mining
operation in the Katanga region of the Belgian Congo when the British took control.

39

The very low population density— and the subsequent inability of German colonialists to
generate a large enough labor pool to develop massive agriculture, in this case sisal
farms— dramatically inhibited their ability to profit from their colonial dealings in
Tanganyika.40 The British had already invested very heavily in Kenya to the North, and
thus were not prepared to invest the money necessary to convert Tanzania into the highproducing agrarian colony they were developing in Kenya, despite relatively similar
geography. In some key respects, such as offering aid to encourage migration of
European settlers to the region, Britain invested even less in Tanganyika, and even in
their capstone colony of Kenya, than the Gennans had.41

38 Elliot Green, "The Political Econom y o f N ation Formation in M odem Tanzania," in Proceedings o f the
A nnual M eeting o f the Am erican P olitical Science Association; Toronto, Septem ber 2009, proceedings o f
The A nnual M eeting o f the A m erican Political Science Association, University o f Toronto, 11.
,9 It is perhaps o f indication o f how poorly Germ any did as a colonial pow er in general that Tanzania was
considered its “m ost valued colony.” From Iliffe, A Modern History o f Tanganyika, 261. This certainly has
to do with the lack o f investment, highlighted by Elliot Green in the citation above.
40 Elliot Green, "The Political Econom y o f N ation Formation in Modern Tanzania," in Proceedings o f the
A nnual M eeting o f the Am erican Political Science Association; Toronto, Septem ber 2009, proceedings o f
The Annual M eeting o f the A m erican Political Science Association, U niversity o f Toronto, 10.
41 Iliffe, A M odern H istory o fT angayika, 303. The British had fewer colonists in Kenya than did the
Germans in Tanganyika by 1914.
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In fact, the only key economic development during the British rule was the
growth of cash cropping, especially coffee, by Africans themselves outside of colonial
control.

49

Tanzanians also resisted colonial attempts at controlling economics through

centralization and coercive agricultural mandates. The relative paucity o f economic
benefit from the Tanganyikan colony, and the same international pressures pushing for
African liberation which were affecting Belgium in the Congo, made the decision for the
British to abandon their colonial aspirations in Tanganyika easier than in other colonies
like Kenya. They engaged in a peaceful transfer of power to the Tanzanians, headed by
Julius Nyerere, on December 9, 1961. This peaceful transfer was not, however, the
product of the paternal largesse of former colonizers, rather it also came about due to
intense political pressure applied by TANU and its activists for many years, including
Nyerere's pressure on the U.N. to allow the "trustee" state its full rights as an independent
nation.
Biographical Sketch: Nyerere
Despite some heirarchization of influence within Zanaki culture, the notion of
consensus-based decision making and the reality that a functional community could be
largely devoid o f institutional hierarchy stayed with Nyerere his entire life. Kambarage
Nyerere was born during the March rains of 1922 into the “acephalous Zanaki society”
and had origins not unlike many of his countrymen.43 The Zanaki largely hunted for food,
in a “stark... land of granite outcroppings” but were famed cattle raisers as well.44 Zanaki

42 Ibid.
43 Viktoria Stoger-Eising, "'Ujamaa' Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social and
Political Thought," Africa: Journal o f the International African Institute 70, no. 1 (2000): 118.
44 Shirley Graham Du Bois, Julius K. Nyerere: Teacher o f Africa (New York: Julian M essner, 1975), 17.
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communities were often loose affiliations of homesteads spread across the savannah
region of northwest Tanzania. Decisions were arrived at through negotiations between
homestead leaders, and discussion would continue until consensus was achieved.45 It is
important to point out that this consensus was sometimes achieved through forms of
coercion, and people who violated Zanaki cultural precepts to a profound degree were
exiled from their community when it was deemed essential.46 Community respect was
determined largely by gerontocracy, though spiritual and technological practitioners—
especially rainmakers and blacksmiths— were deemed particularly important to
community life.47
Nyerere’s mother, Mgaya, the fifth wife in her household and thus not a
prominent member of it, has been accounted for variously in histories of his life, and
some modem revisionist histories claim her to be an important practitioner of
“witchcraft” in her community. 48 Whatever the position of his mother, it is beyond
dispute that his father, named Burito, was considered a diviner of some talent within the
region.49 This local influence caused the Gennans to appoint him “ch ief’ when they
fonnalized indirect rule powers in the region. According to Nyerere this construct did not
resonate within the Zanaki community, and neither his father, nor Nyerere himself

45 Stoger-Eising,"'U jam aa' Revisited." 122.
46 Ibid.
47 For example, see John Iliffe, A M odern H istory o f Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), 203. Iliffe suggests that rainmakers were not used only for summoning rains, but were to be
consulted for all matters o f life, from the m undane upward.
48 Robert M ugagga, "Yes, Nyerere Could M ake a Great Saint!" The Observer (Kampala), O ctober 29,
2009.
49 Stoger-Eising, "’U jam aa’ Revisited,” 124.
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received special treatment from peers because of this titular commendation.50 The
benefits received from Burito’s position in the colonial system did have profound effects
on Nyerere’s educational opportunities, however.
Nyerere’s formal education began when he turned 12, when he began attending a
local primary school in the region.51 At the Native Authority Boarding School in the
town of Mwisenge, Nyerere’s academic gifts became immediately apparent. A classmate
recalled that “because o f his brilliance” Nyerere became a focus of attention and affection
from fellow students and teachers alike.52 He was soon transferred to the Tabora Boys
Secondary School, a Catholic-run institution, and one of the only secondary schools open
to Africans in the country. Tabora graduates were being groomed by the British to
occupy management positions within the indirect rule system of governance. It was an
elitist academy “modeled upon Eton”, and was exclusively open to the sons of chiefs. 53
These children of “superior upbringing” received numerous privileges, including having
servants who cleaned up after them.54 At Tabora Nyerere converted to Catholicism in
1944, and his faith became an instrumental part of the rest of his life, including his
political philosophies. No account exist to explain the nature of his conversion, but it
seems his encounter with Catholicism, even within the context of parochial school

50 Ibid., 124.
M Haroub Othman, "Nyerere's Political Legacy," in Tanzania A fter N yerere (London: Pinter, 1988), 158.
52 Kiluba Lukuba-M vwanda Nkulu, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere's vision o f higher education for Tanzania"
(diss., University o f Kentucky, 2001), 105. As the school’s name implies it was a school which largely
catered to the sons o f local chiefs, o f whom Burito Nyerere was one.
’3 Stoger-Eising, "’U jam aa’ Revisited,” 128.
54 Ibid., 106.
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affected him deeply, and his faith was something profoundly meaningful to him. After his
conversion he was given the “Christian” name “Julius.”55
Nyerere graduated with distinction from Tabora in 1942, and immediately
received a scholarship to study at Makerere University, then Makerere College, in
Uganda. It was here that Nyerere first explored politics as he helped found a chapter of
the Tanzania African Association, the body which later became the Tanzanian African
National Union (TANU) political party, at the college.56 After distinguishing himself
academically at Makerere through mastery of his subject fields and his obvious eloquence
as a speaker and writer, and attaining a good teaching position at a secondary school in
Tanzania, Nyerere received the first scholarship of its kind offered to a Tanzanian that
enabled him to study for his Masters degree at the University of Edinburgh. 57
Nyerere left for Edinburgh in 1949, and his political interests grew during his time
in the land of Tanzania’s colonizer. He joined the Fabian Colonial Bureau, an anti
colonial socialist organization in Britain, and wrote passionately on the subject of East
African independence during his time at the university.

^g

Upon his return to Tanzania in

late 1952, he was among a handful of highly educated Tanzanians, and quickly moved
through the ranks of the Tanzanian African Association to be elected its president in
1953.

55 Nkulu, "Julius Kam barage Nyerere's vision”, 108. In Shirley G raham D ubois’ Julius K. Nyerere:
Teacher o f A frica she quotes Nyerere as saying adopting the name Julius was the only major drawback o f
converting to C hristianity (see page 71).
56 Dubois, Julias K. N yerere, 75.
57 Ibid., 84. The scholarship also supported his family in Tanzania while he was in Scotland.
58 Iliffe, A Modern H istory o f Tanganyika, 508-509.
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Now officially the leading political figure in the nation, Nyerere agitated for
independence before the United Nations in 1955, and in the following six years led an
insistent but non-violent push for autonomy from Britain, which was achieved in late
1961. It was during this crucial period, from 1955-1961, that Nyerere mobilized various
groups of people, especially women, wage-eamers and the poor, around the vision of a
TANU-led independent Tanzania.59 While this push toward national unity was not
without dissent and political contestation, especially from Swahili nationalists and ethnic
loyalists, it was nothing like the bloody chaos which would birth the political dominance
of Nyerere’s counterpart in Congo, Joseph Mobutu.

Biographical Sketch: Mobutu
Mobutu’s early years are somewhat shrouded in mystery as Mobutu routinely
attempted to “mythologize his own upbringing.”60 While there are a number of
biographers and memoirists in the French language who have provided perspective on
Mobutu, only the journalist Michela Wrong in her In the Footsteps o f Mr. Kurtz provides
a long form English language take on Mobutu’s life.61 Whatever the paucity of research,
it is clear that Joseph-Desiree Mobutu was bom in Lisala, Belgian Congo on October 15,
1930. His mother, who came to be known as Mama Yemo, was “either unmarried or
abandoned by her spouse” when she became pregnant with Mobutu. 62 Some accounts

59 Ibid., 542
6(1 Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps o f Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink o f D isaster in M obutu's Congo (New
York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 71.
61 Her book is fascinating and a compelling read, but is almost unsourced. Even direct quotations are
unsourced, only in the end does she make passing references to various works she read researching the
book. This makes her scintillating prose subject to serious academic critique.
62 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 143.
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place her in the "harem" of an Ngabandi chief when Mobutu was conceived, thus giving
Mobutu some "chiefly" lineage, though this claim is of questionable legitimacy on
several levels.63 Regardless, Yemo met and married a local cook named Alberic Gbemani
while pregnant with Mobutu, a man who died when Mobutu was eight. Mobutu's uncle
was an important figure in his early life, and was the one who gave him his “Christian”
name, Joseph-Desiree.
Yemo’s social support network was never strong in her home community of
Lisala, and she moved to Kinshasa (then Leopoldville), while Mobutu was still a child.
This migratory impulse was very common in the Belgian Congo in the late 30s and early
40s as colonial administrators centralized governance and economics in urban areas like
Kinshasa (Leopoldville) and Lubumbashi (Stanleyville). When he reached school age
Yemo sent Mobutu to the care of another uncle, this one in Mbandaka, where he attended
a local parochial boarding school. Like Nyerere, Mobutu’s intellectual abilities were
immediately evident— former classmates recall him always being in the top three
students in his classes.64 It was here that Mobutu demonstrated two key qualities that
differentiated him from his peers: physical prowess, especially through athletic
achievement, and linguistic capability, often exceeding the abilities of his instructors in
the French language. Despite these attributes, Mobutu proved to be a troublemaker with
disdain for authority. In 1949, as Nyerere was travelling to Edinburgh to begin his
graduate studies, Mobutu ran away from school, an act which was considered a crime at

63 Wrong, Mr. K urtz, 73. This is questionable both because it is unclear whether or not Mobutu legitimately
was connected to the chief, and also the relative authority and power o f this chief, even among the
Ngabandi.

64 Ibid.
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the time, stowed away on a boat bound for Kinshasa, and when caught was forced to join
the Force Publique, the Belgian Colonial armed forces, on a seven-year stint.65
His linguistic ability served him well in the Force Publique— he spoke French
with much greater fluency and style than any of his peers— and he became a translator
and voracious reader, consuming especially political works such as Machiavelli’s The
Prince.66 He developed an interest in journalism, and after completing his required seven
years in the army, during which time he achieved the highest rank available to a
Congolese, he quit to join the staff of L'Avenir, a French language daily in Kinshasa. In
1958 he was sent by the newspaper to Brussels to cover the World's Fair, and during his
time in Belgium met Patrice Lumumba. 67
With Lumumba, as was the case with Sergeant Joseph Bobozo in the Force
Publique and the Belgian editor of L 'A venir, Mobutu continued his pattern of attaching
himself to people in power above him, and after ingratiating himself, profiting from their
expertise and connections. True to this method, he quit L'Avenir while in Belgium and
joined Lumumba's political party. He quickly gained the trust of Lumumba and became
"one of his top assistants".68 By the end of his twenties, positioned beside Lumumba,
Mobutu was to be near the center of the political maelstrom that would envelop the
country as the Belgians ceded power to indigenous leadership. Such was M obutu’s
relationship with Lumumba that as the chaos of late 1960 began to overwhelm the

65 Robert B. Edgerton, The Troubled H eart o f Africa: A History o f the Congo (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 2002), 199.
66 Ibid.
67 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The C ongo, 143.
68 Ibid., 144. Lumumba's political party was the M ouvem ent N ational Congolais.
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president, Lumumba dispatched Mobutu across the country to quell rebellious proto
movements.69 It was in the chaos after the assassination of Lumumba, which occurred
with instrumental support from Mobutu, that Mobutu found conditions ripe for his rise to
power. 70
Biographies and Trajectories
It is clear that both men possessed remarkable personal attributes which enabled
them to excel in whatever context they were placed. Both were brilliant, ambitious,
politically masterful and resilient. It is, in fact, the context of development, as much as
any other factor, that made Mobutu into Africa's most hated dictator and Nyerere into the
fondly remembered Mwalimu. Nyerere's constructed connection to the chiefhood
provided him opportunities unavailable to other Tanzanians at the time. Mobutu, on the
other hand, had no structural advantages that would prefigure the political success he so
long enjoyed. His ethnic group was irrelevant on the national scene, he did not complete
secondary school; his martial advancement had more to do with his language ability than
his military prowess, although this skill developed as he climbed ranks in the Force
Publique. It is clear that Mobutu’s political gains were the product of his own wit, his
ability to manipulate alliances, and his genius in propaganda and patronage systems.
Nyerere, who clearly was a brilliant politician in his own right, was also given as
many opportunities to succeed as any Tanzanian of his era. His innate talents were
validated and expanded by his life progression, but had he not been the "son of a chief' or
had he not been able to attend Tabora or Makerere, he would likely have been an

69 Sean Kelly, Am erica's Tyrant (Lanham, Md.: American University Press, 1993), 27.
70 Ibid., 6. Mobutu gave the Belgians details o f Lum um ba’s activities, and his troops were ‘‘guarding”
Lumumba when he “surprisingly” managed to leave his protected residence.
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excellent and brilliant school teacher in Tanzania, rather than perhaps the most influential
African political thinker of all time. Mobutu had no such privileges, and yet clung to
power in a country that was exponentially larger, more complex and less stable than
Nyerere's Tanzania.

71

This contextualizing is important because it speaks to a central theme of this
thesis: Mobutu and Nyerere were men whose national and personal contexts were deeply
relevant in determining the leaders they were to become. A Mobutu-type figure could not
have become the leader o f Tanzania because o f colonial realities and the nature of
meritocratic model of African advancement in the German and British colonies. Likewise
the political context of Zaire made a Nyerere-type leader impossible because of the
chaotic and violent nature of the system which did not reward thoughtful and inclusive
politics. Indeed, perhaps Lumumba was as close to a Nyerere as Congo has ever seen,
and the tragic case of his life serves as a critical example of the impossibility of a
Congolese Nyerere during the immediate post-colonial era.

71 This is not to say that Mobutu was a better leader, per se, but it certainly suggests that his political skills
were among the most remarkable o f his era o f African leaders.
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Part II. Speaking The Nation
\Authenticite], for me, is a French word. It is... the situation, the life of our
forbears, how they lived, their mentalities, their actions, their travels. I think.
79
— from an interview with an unnamed Zairian JMPR schoolboy, 1975
The word "ujamaa" was chosen for special reasons... it is an African word and
thus emphasizes the African-ness of the policies we intend to follow.
— Julius Nyerere, 19687J
In Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson examined the instrumentality of
language in the production of nationalism. He suggested that the language of the nation
operates as a proxy for sacred language, and suggested these "languages-of-state" become
entwined with the will and purpose of the government.74 The elevation of a vernacular to
the position of language-of-state, or the acceptance of an external universal-imperial as
the national language, Anderson argued, profoundly affects the character of the state. In
the period immediately following the end of European colonialism Mobutu and Nyerere
engaged in similar attempts to coalesce divergent ethnic, political and economic inteests
around conceptions of national identity. The languages at the core of these projects were
French, a universal-imperial colonial import, and Swahili, an “elevated” vernacular.
The Zairian schoolboy confused about “authenticity” (authenticite) was a
member of the JMPR, the youth wing of M obutu’s Mouvement Populaire de la

72 Michael G. Schatzberg, "Fidelite au Guide: The J.M.P.R. in Zairian Schools," The Journal o f Modern
African Studies 16, no. 3 (September 1978): 426.
73 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and D evelopm ent: Ulntru na Maendeleo: A Selection from Writings and
Speeches, 1968-1973 (New York: Oxford UP, 1974), 2.
74 Benedict Anderson, Im agined Communities R efectio n s on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism, New
Edition (New York: Verso, 2006), 84.
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Revolution, and was from Lisala, M obutu’s birthplace.75 The JPMR schoolboy belied the
implemented realities of M obutu’s aspirations for “authenticity” in two key ways. Before
any attempt to define the term the boy identified that the phrase was derived from French.
In doing so he expressed alienation from the concept, and distanced its implications from
his own experience. If the term was in his mother tongue, identification of the language
would have been unnecessary. Even more critical than his distance from language, is that
he concluded his remark about the definition of one of the three tenants of Mobutuism
with the phrase “I think.” His lack of comprehension about this crucial aspect of state
policy mirrored broader societal disconnect with this legislated attempt to bridge a
"common cultural heritage" with a "revolutionary" future.76
Mobutu’s use o f French as the language of the new state alienated his project
from the people of Congo. The failure of this nation-building project occurred because
the ideas behind it had no social meaning, and remained an “outside” conceptualization
of a deeply internal identification process. If a youth member of M obutu’s own party,
from his hometown, propagandized through an education system of M obutu’s own
devising could not identity this core principle of the Mobutist state, who could?
Nyerere’s words above provide a counterpoint to the JMPR youth’s confusion.
Nyerere suggested that ujamaa was a word every Tanzanian would immediately
recognize and understand, and indeed the idea of family and its social implications was
obvious to any African society based on kinship networks. Ujamaa is variously

7y Schatzberg, 425-426. The MPR was Mobutu's political party, and until 1990 totally dominated the
politics o f Zaire, often with legally sanctioned exclusion o f all other parties. The M ouvem ent Populaire de
la Revolution is most often Anglicized as the “ Revolutionary Popular Movement.”
76 Zaire, Makanda Kabobi, M anifesto at N 'Se/e, by Mobutu Sese Seko (N'Sele, 1967), 30.
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translated, but is best rendered in English as “family-ways.”77 Connecting this political
philosophy with family tied it to a fundamental principle of self-conception in most
African communities: kinship.78 Being “authentic” had no such cultural resonance.
Ujamaa's familiarity to every Tanzanian imbued it with meaning bom of personal
experience— it was no foreign invader that required identification and explication before
exploration and implementation. Nyerere further emphasized that ujamaa was an African
word, reflecting the “African-ness” of his political movement. It is instructive that
Nyerere focused on ujamaa as an African constmct, and de-emphasized its Tanzanian or
even Zanaki roots. This speaks to Nyerere's Pan-Africanist aspirations for both his
national model and for the Swahili language. The language of ujamaa is not identified as
Swahili; it is simply "African." Despite other failures of his regime, this section will
argue that Nyerere’s use of Swahili as a nationalizing language was a key factor in
contributing to the successful development of a de-ethnicized, highly literate, and socially
connected national populace in post-colonial Tanzania, and that ultimately Nyerere’s
implementation of Swahili as Tanzania's national language and the language of his
political philosophy contributed to its rise to become the preeminent African language.
Language in Colonial Tanzania and Congo
These national languages did not emerge ex nihilo; both French and Swahili
played important roles in the colonial era of Congo and Tanzania respectively. The
Belgian’s colonial project was overtly commercial, but relied upon a coercive method of
77 It is also translated as family-hood and family-ness, but "ways" speaks better to its pragmatic intent.
Nyerere himself translated it as family-hood.
78 See, among many others, Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, A History o f Sub-Saharan Africa (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Collins and Burns textbook is one o f many synthetic works that
distill kinship as among the principle, and nearly universal, elements of pre-colonial African societal
structures.
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commerce that required the routine implementation of brutal military force to generate
sufficient labor.79 Administrators expressed little desire or experienced any incentive to
institutionalize an African language for reasons other than administrative utility.
The origins of Lingala, the language that became Congo’s African lingua franca,
coincide with the first Western incursions— initially in the form of H. Morton Stanley’s
“exploratory” trips— into Congo’s interior, and does not appear to be an even regionally
used language prior to that point.80 Unlike Swahili, Lingala was borne to serve the
immediate needs of colonialists, and their precursors, who were attempting to
administrate and exploit a vast and culturally non-contiguous space. The eventual
practice of using Lingala in the colonial military was merely pragmatic, as many
Congolese in the military were from western provinces, and already spoke Lingala as
lingua franca. Lingala was also useful because it did not derive from an ethnic
community, a fact which prevented the militarization, and thus empowerment, of any
*
specific ethnic group. 81 Prior to World War I, the Belgians used parallel African
lingua
franca in the militaries o f the east (Swahili) and west (Lingala), but unified the military
under Lingala after the war.82 Lingala's repurposing as a lingua franca, bom in Congo of
European imperative, was in the eyes of the colonial administrators preferable to Swahili,

79 So many texts support this claim that is uncontested. Most prominent among accounts o f the brutality o f
Leopold's regime is Adam Hochschild's King Leopold's Ghost (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999).
80 William J. Samarin, "Protestant Missions and the History o f Lingala," Journal o f Religion in Africa 16,
no. 2 (June 1986): 138.
81 There is some dispute about the origins of Lingala, but current consensus points toward the obscurity to
the point o f insignificance o f any Bangala "core" ethnic group from which Lingala emerged as a lingua
franca.
82 Charles Gilman, "Convergence in Lingala and Zairian Swahili," A nthropological Linguistics 21, no. 2
(February 1979): 106. The heritage o f this can be seen in the fact that many Lingala words for weaponry, in
particular, are directly derived from Swahili. See this section o f Gilman for cases.
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which after World War I was considered a foreign tongue, belonging in British
colonies.83 Lingala was also deemed preferable to French in military applications, as
teaching common soldiers French would begin a process o f “social elevation,” something
the Belgians were not keen to encourage among the rank and file of the armed forces.
The preponderant usage of Lingala over French in the military can be seen as early as
1904.84 The schismatic nature of Belgian identity, pulled between Flemish and Walloon
cultural-linguistic heritages, provides some explanation of why the Belgians sought to
slow French assimilationist pretensions which could emerge culturally in Congo. The
French assimilationist model of colonialism theoretically tied the usage of the French
language to the “evolution” of an African toward the ideal of French citizenry.

85

Walloon

French was the language of the Belgian elite, including Leopold II, and was thus deemed
superior to Flemish, which was used by the working classes. “Protecting” French was in
the interest of these elite colonialists. The norm of authority in Congo was thus
established with French as a signifier of power and privilege, Lingala as signifier of far
less potent African power, and other ethnic languages part of the milieu of the masses.
French was held as a prized commodity for the elite of Congo’s populace, its serious
usage “restricted” for most, and passed down to those deemed worthy by the state as

83 This concern with Swahili as a foreign force is similar to concerns many in the administration, including
Leopold II as an early example, with the possibility o f “English colonies” cropping up within the Congo if
protestant missionaries were allowed to teach students in English. This led to a prohibition against all
English instruction. For more see Barbara Yates, "The Origins o f Language Policy in Zaire," The Journal
o f M odern African Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1980): 264.
84 As quoted in Yates, "Origins o f Language Policy,” 261.
85 Benedict Anderson, Im agined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism, New
Edition (New York: Verso, 2006), 1 10. This claim can be contested by works such as Yates’ "Origins o f
Language Policy," 258. Here she quotes Belgian policy documents which encourage military officers to use
French when possible with their Congolese soldiers. However, this can be seen as a component o f the “gift”
o f French for “deserving” Congolese: only elites in the military were encouraged to be fluent in French.
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something of a reward.86 The use of language in symbolic domination suggests that
French inferred external domination on the Congolese populace, and Congolese who used
French participated in this stratification and external domination.

87

Further opposition to

French acquisition by Congolese citizens came from the powerful Catholic Church in
Congo for reasons similar to the ones eventually propagated by the Belgian colonial
state.88
The Congolese people also found ways to implement the emergent African lingua
franca into their social interactions. These pseudo-indigenous lingua franca, largely
Lingala and Swahili, were used in ethnic interactions as social leveler, “a language
nobody knows,” as a way to avoid privileging the language of either group in sensitive
talks. In both colonial and indigenous power hierarchies French was used for the exact
opposite purpose: deliberate social stratification. 89 A key point on this subject is that
Lingala and French were both non-ethnic languages applied largely as instruments of
military and colonial administration, and thus were not socially transmitted in Congolese
ethnic communities to a large degree.
In addition to English, Swahili was used by the British in Tanganyika, and by the
Germans before them, for logistic expediency to facilitate the direct rule model of
colonial administration, in colonial Tanzania “Kiswahili was the national language while
86 Gilman, "Convergence,” 99. See also the section o f this paper on French as a “false reward” for more on
indigenous perception o f the “gift” o f French.
87 Monica Heller, "Language choice, social institutions, and symbolic domination," Language in Society 24,
no. 3 (September 1995): 373.
88 Yates, “Language Policy,” 261-263. Yates adds complication to this statement, however, by pointing out
that many o f the ground level religious workers, such as missionaries, were lower class Flemish Belgians
whose own grasp o f French was tenuous, and thus had low personal impetus to propagate the language.
89 Gilman, “Convergence,” 100.
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English was the official language.”90 Beyond being simply a “horizontal means of
communication between various people in society... Kiswahili also became an
instrument o f nation-building, colonial state-formation, and vertical mediation between
the government and the wider society.”91 This co-option of Swahili, o f course, had
implications on the development of the language and the perception people had of the
language itself. However, unlike French, Swahili had a long history as a lingua franca in
East Africa, and the adoption of Swahili as a language-of-power by colonial
administrators did not radically transform people’s relationship to the language on a
practical level. It was still, throughout the colonial period, a language that was more often
spread through socialization than formal education. 92
Naming the Nation
The use of an imperial European language to articulate an authentic African
context is not without complication. This can be seen in a brief study of the origin of the
word “Zaire” itself. The term "Zaire" first appeared as Portuguese explorer Diego Cao’s
bastardization of the Kongo word nzadi, an indigenous name for the great river that
emptied itself into the ocean at the coast.93 This Portuguese interpretation of nzadi
travelled back to Europe, where its exoticism briefly caught the attention of the
enlightenment artists of the period. Eventually it emerged in Voltaire’s famous
eponymous play. It was the word Zaire popularized in this play that Mobutu interpreted
90 Mazrui, Alamin M., and Ali A. Mazrui. "Dominant Languages in a Plural Society: English and Kiswahili
in Post-Colonial Last Africa." International Political Science Review 14, no. 13 (July 1993): 280.
91 Ibid., 277.
92 Ibid., 284.
9-1 Kabwit. Ghislain. "Zaire: The Roots o f a Continuing Crisis." The .Journal o f Modern African Studies 17,
no. 3 (September 1973): 389. Cao was the first European to see the Congo delta.
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as “authentic”, removed the name “Congo,” obviously derived from the Kongo people,
and replaced it with a French co-opted, Portuguese bastardized, coastal Kongo created
term for the great river. Such were the complexities of co-opting a European language to
speak “authentically” about an African cultural product.
In Congo, French was tied to official bureaucracy, and a mastery of the language
was a pre-condition for entering the petite bourgeoisie of evolues, and with it access to
the greatest measure o f indigenous power in the Belgian colonial state. Despite its
instrumentality in social mobility, it was not taught in indigenous schools.94 Later,
language stratification contributed to relative positions in the hyper-bureaucracy of the
Zairian state, a product itself o f the relegation of the petite bourgeoisie to the second tier
of state power after M obutu’s meteoric rise. Mobutu presided over the upper level of
politicians who “clustered around the Presidency and State commissaries” and created a
“lower level,... the refuge of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, a group which lost its
privileges and whose standard of living declined, so that its actual economic position
[became] closer to that o f the labouring masses.” 95 Thus the disparity between the mass
of Zairians who spoke various ethnic and preponderant African languages and the
French-speaking elite was made more complex by stratification within the Frenchspeaking elite themselves. Indeed, the usage of French was denied to those in "inferior
capacities" within government beurocracy; they used Lingala officially instead.96 On a

94 Makim M. Mputubwele, "The Zairian Language Policy and Its Effect on the Literatures in National
Languages," .Journal o f B lack Studies 34, no. 2 (November 2003): 275.
^ J. P. Peemans, "The Social and Economic Development o f Zaire since Independence: An Historical
Outline," African Affairs 74, no. 295 (April 1975): 162.
% Wyatt MacGaffey, "The Implantation o f Kimbanguism in Kisangani, Zaire," The Journal o f African
History 23, no. 2 (1982): 393.
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structural level, the French language was perhaps the European language least suited to
the articulation of an alternate nationality and culture, as it “has an unparalleled history of
concern about its cultural identity” that is “deeply intertwined with the idea of a French
nation.”97 Despite the Belgian national colonial influence, the French language itself
intrinsically connected the culture of Congo to both Brussels and Paris.
Neither Mobutu nor Nyerere instituted a language policy off the trajectory of the
colonial administrators use of language. Doing so would have been pragmatically
impossible. That said, both had the opportunity to address and modify the strategic
importance of the national language on a comprehensive level. While Nyerere took
Swahili, already a major linguistic force in Tanzania, and centralized its importance and
utility in the state, Mobutu retained the essential ideological and strategic importance of
French in the state, and continued Belgian policies of Lingala propagation as a second
tier language of administrative authority, clearly removed from elevated positions held by
French-speakers.
Language, Ethnicity and Nationalism
During M obutu’s rise to power in the early 1960s the two major African vehicular
languages present in Congo were Lingala, based largely in the west, and Swahili, based
in the east and south, and two relatively minor ones: Kikongo and Tshiluba, both of
which had stronger ethnic ties than either Swahili or Lingala. While Congo’s first elected
leader, Patrice Lumumba, spoke fluent Swahili in addition to Lingala, Mobutu spoke no
Swahili and never learned the language.98 Mobutu, Lumumba's right hand in the late 50s,

97 David A. Murray, "The Cultural Citizen: Negations o f Race and Language in the Making of
Martiniquais," A nthropological Quarterly 70, no. 2 (April 1997): 80.
98 Crawford Young, Rise and D ecline o f the Zairian State (Madison, Wis: University o f Wisconsin P,
1985), 154.
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saw the impact of ethnicized politics in Congo in the Katangan secession and the
implications of ethnically based party politics contributing significantly to much of the
chaos in the Congo Crisis. M obutu’s own kinship community had never really been
among his native Ngbandi, as they were a small ethnic group, unsuited for M obutu’s
insatiable ambitions. Instead, he created a pseudo-kinship network in the military, the
command structure o f which was organized around two linguae francae: French and
Lingala. He did this by maintaining Lingala as the languag of the military, and refusing to
learn or speak any other African languages, like Swahili, other than his native tongue and
Lingala. Neither French nor Lingala could be claimed as “belonging” to a specific
Congolese ethnic group, as French was an obvious foreign import and Lingala was a non
ethnic indigenous vernacular. Thus M obutu’s two languages, beyond his mother-tongue,
Ubangi, were commercial, political, military and utilitarian, but not ethnic. A case study
of M obutu’s attempt to create a non-ethnic African identity centers around the 1971
proces of renaming himself Mobutu Sese Seko. In doing so Mobutu re-christened (or de
christened) himself using Lingala, the language of his constructed politicized and
militarized kinship network, rather than his own ethnic Ngbandi mother tongue. Although
he lacked much formal education, being expelled from Catholic school in junior high for
running away from school for a romantic tryst in Kinshasa, M obutu’s relationship with
French was important at an early age, when his mastery of it exceeded many new army
recruits, and won him a plum desk jo b ." He learned French during his first encounters
with formal education, and French became the language he used for government, political
theorizing and propaganda. Mobutu was further fighting against an internal ethnic

99 Young and Turner, Rise and D ecline, 174.
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“redefinition” process which was occurring, a process which was doing the opposite of
what Mobutu was attempting.100 This “redefinition” was moving particularly urban
Zairians toward greater differentiation and acceptance of ethnic adherence, rather than
towards the generic “African-ness” Mobutu was pushing. This process was emerged as
political parties attempted to create power bases, and the most obvious mechanism for
doing so was around ethnic identities. Mobutu’s systematic attempts to “de-ethnicize” the
people of Zaire wilted in the face of the power ethnic identification had to energize
nascent political mobilization.101 Nonetheless, M obutu’s political acumen and divide and-rule leadership style was able to quell ethnic mobilization in a way that French could
not. Using a monolithic non-African language to mitigate against ethnic affiliation was
made more complex as ethnic identity in Africa consists of “interlocking, overlapping,
multiple collective identities,” few of which, in Congo, were French-based. 102
Distilling Africanity to a single linguistic form with no pre-colonial connection to
indigenous identity held little chance for success. Indeed, even at the time some critics of
Mobutu's authenticite campaign wondered why he did not implement an African
language to replace French if his stated goal was to faithfully reflect African traditions.
By contrast, Swahili partly de-ethnicized the people who used it simply by its method of
transmission. It was disseminated through socialization, and thus could act as a
replacement language for a mother-tongue. In the context of language it is important to
distinguish between creating a national identity and a shared cultural identity. As Nyerere

100 Ibid., 144.
101 Ibid., 149-150.
102 Young and Turner, citing Southall on page 147. Original source: Aidan Southall, “The Illusion of
Tribe,” Journal o f Asian and African Studies 5, no 1-2, (1970) , 44.
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said, “A country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of people
without the spirit which makes them a nation.”

1 OT

This becomes the tension between

constructions of ideology and constructions of identity. Because of the ultimate
hollowness of the ideology, as suggested at the outset of this paper, Mobutu’s ideology of
authenticite failed to impact the people he propagandized. The notion of Zaire dissipated
as quickly as Mobutu himself in 1997, remembered by contemporary Congolese as
something of a bad dream. Indeed, the intense integration of ideology and identity in
Mobutuism fated the failure of the political/social system if it could not be integrated as a
meaningful personal identity by the Zairians themselves. It clearly failed in this respect.
Ujamaa as political ideology and economic system failed as well, and this
“conceptualization of Tanzanian socialism as Ujamaa... clearly remained... little more
than rhetoric” to most Tanzanians.104 That said, Nyerere’s vision of Swahili as a
transformative language in Tanzania was realized in other ways, as is revealed in a brief
examination of the development o f language.

Swahili has gone through four major stages of development, but began as the
language of a small coastal ethnic group in East Africa. Ethnic Swahilis interacted with
Arab Muslim and Portuguese traders and missionaries for centuries prior to the colonial
era, and through these interactions the language was transformed, and became infused
with Arabic vocabulary and Islamic theology. Indeed, Islam in East Africa was the first
force to widely disseminate Swahili, both as a language of trade, and as a “truth103 Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: U/nint Na Umoja A Selection from Writings and
Speeches 1952-65 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 186-187.
104 Gregory H. Maddox and James L. Giblin, eds., In Search o f a Nation: H istories o f Authority &
D issidence in Tanzania (Athens, Ohio: Ohio UP, 2006), 308.
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language” imbued with “the impulse to conversion.” 105 With German and British
colonialism, Islam’s influence in Tanzania’s Swahili-speaking areas waned, and
Swahili’s development was co-opted by the new dominant power, Germany, as a suitable
language to organize bureaucracy in the colonial state. The German language had little
influence on the structure of language, which actually bore more signs of its first
European linguistic contact: Portuguese.106 German Tanganyika was also the only state
under German control to use Swahili— they made no attempt to integrate Swahili into
Rwandan or Burundian administration.107 The decision to administrate through Swahili
was reaffirmed by Britain when they became “entrusted” with Tanganyika after World
War I by the League of Nations. British colonial administrators were already familiar
with Swahili from colonial usage in Kenya, Tanzania’s northern neighbor. This made
Swahili a connective agent for all of British East Africa. Swahili remained an important
administrative language in the British East African structure until independence.

The final co-option of Swahili by political authority occurred when Tanganyikan
nationalists, lead by Julius Nyerere, recognized Swahili as a potentially useful instrument
in the attempt to create and refine a particular national/African identity among the people
of Tanzania. This was because it was both “African,” that is Bantu-derived and
associated with African speakers, and non-ethnic, as the Swahili people made up a
relatively small component of the population of Tanzania and lacked the demographic

105 Ibid., 14-15.
106 Gilman, “ Convergence,” 101. Gilm an’s examples o f Portuguese lexicography in Swahili are mesa
(table), ananasi (pineapple), and bendela (flag). Gilman points out that these terms are shared between
Lingala and Swahili because the languages share Portuguese influence in their development.
107 At the time this was, o f course, one nation called Ruanda-Urundi.
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mass to rise into power on Swahili nationalism. This trajectory of evolution can be seen
as a movement from a particular language, that of a small ethnic group on east Africa’s
coast, into its current “universalist stage where the language has become the most widely
used African language internationally and is becoming the medium of scientific discourse
and technology.” 108 There is great intentionality in the way Nyerere directed this rise, as
discussed below. Both French and Swahili straddled the universal/particular divide, but in
the African context Swahili succeeded in ways that French did not. Swahili could be
“owned” by an African nation, whereas French, at least culturally, derived its linguistic
authority from the directives and innovations of Paris, and politically from Brussels in the
case of colonial Congo.
The Implementation of Nationalizing Languages
An obvious implementation of French in M obutu’s Zaire was with the articulation
of the guiding political principles of the nation as put forward in the political theory
known as Mobutuism. Mobutu’s famous Manifesto at N ’Sele in 1967 provided the
justification and framework for this paternalistic political philosophy. But how accepted
and internalized was this top-down directive? A case study produced by Allan Roberts, a
Congo expert at UCLA, based on his experiences in the early 1970s in Lubanda, eastern
Congo, reveals some deep dissonance between the French-speaking government based in
Kinshasa and Zairians in Lubanda who spoke Swahili. Roberts witnessed a sorcery trial
which was underway, and government officials wished to intervene and impose
centralized law over the traditional methods of interpretation and imposing justice. The
locals had executed a suspected sorcerer, and during contestation between a
representative of the state and a local leader, the frustrated state official realizes he is not
108 Mazrui and Mazrui, "Dominant Languages," 276.
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being taken seriously because he does not speak the local language, and “shouted in
broken Swahili that 'fire will rain down on you' for allowing the murder to occur.” 109 The
people are nonplussed, and further lose respect for the official as he is unable to speak the
“real” language of the region with any proficiency. Despite a mastery of Lingala and
French, the “commandant's broken Swahili was evidence of his outsider status, and a
source of quiet derision by people in Lubanda.”110 This same dissonance could not have
occurred in the same way in Tanzania, not specifically because of the prevalence of
Swahili per se, but because the language of the state and the common language of the
people were one.
Nyerere’s first encounter with Swahili was at the age of 12, during his initial
experience with formal education, having spoken only his native Zanaki as a child.111
Nyerere later made education, and the use of Swahili in it, a fundamental component of
his political reform and nationalizing vision. This emphasis on education did not consist
merely of empty promises. Tanzania went from an abysmal literacy rate of approximately
20 percent at independence to over 66 percent of all citizens in 1976, the highest in
Africa at the time.112 This had much to do with a policy enacted in 1970 that mandated
the elimination of illiteracy in Tanzania by 1975 through educational reform, which

109 Allen F. Roberts, "'Authenticity' and Ritual Gone Awry in Mobutu's Zaire: Looking Beyond Turnerian
Models," Journal o f Religion in Africa 24, no. 2 (May 1994): 156.
110 Roberts, 157.
111 Viktoria Stoger-Eising. ""Ujamaa" Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social
and Political Thought." Africa: Journal o f the International African Institute 70, no. 1 (2000): 128.
U2Rodger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (Boulder, CO: Westview P, 1982), 126.
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created compulsory education and language instruction . 113 Swahili became the language
of every strata of Tanzania society, and far beyond M obutu’s usage of language as a
political, bureaucratic and propagandistic tool, Nyerere had grander visions for the
language. He worked to translate some of the most important literary works in the
English language into Swahili in order to “indisputably refute” notions of the inferiority
of Swahili to other universal languages. Indeed, Nyerere’s translations of some of
William Shakespeare’s most famous works manage to impeccably reproduce in Swahili
the complexity, levels o f meaning, and beauty of the words of the man who was arguably
the English language’s greatest ever practitioner. Nyerere translated Shakespeare’s Julius
Caesar (Jitlias i Kaizari) and The Merchant of Venice (Mapebari wa Venisi) and oversaw
the translation of Macbeth. 114 To Nyerere, Swahili was not just a tool for creating a
nation; it was proof that the expressions of the African mind were equal in quality and
power to any produced by the function of Western intellect.
Finally, when looking at implementations of these languages by these men, it is
instructive to look at the ways in which each man named and renamed themselves as a
way to examine their relationship to language. As mentioned in the biographical sketches,
Mobutu was bom Joseph-Desiree Mobutu, emerging from the womb imprinted with an
identity of French origin. Nyerere’s transition from “Kambarage” to “Julius” was, despite
its origins from the priests at Tabora, was something Nyerere later embraced, and he
formally used only his middle initial later in life. This was perhaps an attempt to distance

113 Regie Stites and Ladislaus Semali, "Adult Literacy for Social Lquality or Economic Growth? Changing
Agendas for Mass Literacy in China and Tanzania," Comparative Education Review 35, no. 1 (February
1991): 53.
114 Phil Noss and Peter Rinju, "Mwalimu Nyerere Engages His People: Scripture Translation in Swahili
Verse," S1L Journal o f Translation 3, no. 1 (2007): 41-53.
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the animism of his origins from the devout Catholicism of his later life. An alternate
explanation would be an attempt to de-ethnicize his name, moving away from Zanaki
roots to a more generally African identity. Mobutu was content to use his birth name until
he proclaimed an en masse return to African roots, a move that included casting off
colonial nomenclature by returning to “African” names. The extent, meaning and utility
can be questioned at the outset, and it is worth noting that his wife, Marie-Antoinette
Mobutu, refused to “Africanize” her nam e.115
Marie-Anoinette provides an interesting entre to briefly examine how gender and
language interplayed in these regimes. In contrast to French, Swahili is a non-gendered
language. The pronoun yeye is neutral, and is always either him or her, and this principle
extends to all pronoun usage in Kiswahili. French ascribes gender to every noun.
Nyerere’s honorific mwalimu (teacher) must be compared to M obutu’s “father” honorific.
Indeed, in a remarkable inversion, Tanzanian female political activists called Nyerere
mwanangu, my son.116 These two conceptions of leadership, one non-gendered (or at
least of complex gender orientation), one instrumentally associated with gender, play out
in the symbols and of the nation presented. Mobutu’s usage of leopard print dates to a
tale he told about his childhood, and conquering his fears to slay a leopard and claim his
man-hood. Nyerere, by contrast, elevated the intellectual and agrarian aspects of
Tanzanian life. Certainly the agrarian life was one which concerned both male and female
members of society equally. Working for the common good, rather than for Papa
Mobutu, in Tanzania became a national project both genders could partake in equally, at
least in theory.
115 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 360.
116 Maddox and Giblin, In Search o f a Nation, 284.
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Conclusion
Finally, it should certainly be acknowledged that Mobutu and Nyerere had
different intentions in their national imagination projects. M obutu’s use of French, and to
a lesser extent Lingala, reflects his conception of the state as an appendage of his will.
French suited Mobutu’s personal goals for the state, as it reinforced stratification in
society between those who could utilize the imperial language and those who could not,
and by extension those who had access to power and those who did not. Indeed, even this
disconnect reflected the hollow political ideologies proffered under Mobutuism, which
embodied a kind of Orwellian double-speak. How could a word like authenticite,
emanating from a language o f oppression and colonization ever hope to deeply reconnect
Africans to a meaningful sense of their past?
Nyerere’s intentions with Swahili were at once both grander and more simple.
Nyerere sought to Africanize his people, meaning that he wanted to connect them to an
identity broader than their nation and ethnic heritages. In doing so, he wanted to make a
further philosophical point about the elegance, power and beauty of African identify as
manifest in Swahili, a language he sought to universalize. The current demographics of
Swahili’s spread into east, and now central and south, of Africa speak to the success of
this project. Swahili has spread widely from its coastal East African roots, and is now the
most widely spoken African language, with an estimated 100 million speakers. By
comparison Lingala firmly remains a language particular to Congo, spoken by
approximately 10 million people. Nyerere undeniably had much to do with the
popularization and dissemination of Swahili, even beyond Africa’s borders. Indeed,
African-American interest in African languages has been focused largely on Swahili (as
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seen in the holiday Kwanzaa, for example) no doubt because of Nyerere’s stances on
Pan-Africanism, African liberation and his decision to seriously consider and support
African intellectualism. Nyerere’s sincerity, intellectual acuity and passion for African
identity transcended his limitations and failings as a political leader, making his legacy in
Africa’s modem history one viewed in a largely positive light.
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French is still very much a force in Congo today. Congo has become the largest
French-speaking nation on earth, and French-language music and art produced by
Congolese definitively impacted metropolitan French and Belgian culture. Congolese
ethnic identities are still of instrumental importance in modem Congolese politics, and
were protected, as this paper argues, by the veneer of the imperial language used by the
state— none of the ethnic co-option of language as occurred in Nyerere’s Tanzania could
occur in M obutu’s Zaire. M obutu’s ideas of Zaire, Mobutuism, authenticite are now
viewed as ideological smokescreens for his insatiable kleptocratic tendencies, and even at
the time “fooled no one— except those on the take, who were more than willing to be
deceived.” 118
Benedict Anderson can usefully be invoked again, especially with his comment
that “All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them
characteristic amnesias.” French, by its inability to supplant indigenous language
systems, failed to implement a change in consciousness, and likewise a collective
amnesia. Indigenous collective memory was firmly entrenched in the colonial period, and
Mobutu’s language policy did nothing to displace it— if anything he solidified it further.

117 Anthony Bogues, "Julius Nyerere: Radical African Humanism, Equality, and Decolonization," in Black
Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 2003), 95-124.
1ls Roberts, 152.
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French remained a language of the other, Lingala a language o f the servant class. Swahili,
as it passed socially and replaced or supplanted cultural linguistic elements, succeeded in
the project o f imagining a community, because it changed the way the past, and thus
communal identity, was remembered. Tanzania remembered the “family-ways” because
Ujamaa political philosophy, for all its failings as an idea and a process, took root in
socialized modes of communication and community-building in Tanzania.
This section is obviously just the beginning of the process of examining the
complex ways language, nationalism and African identity interacted in M obutu’s Zaire
and Nyerere’s Tanzania in the immediate post-colonial period. The ways in which each
country’s development and self-concept emerged independently and through interaction
is of primary importance in understanding how the tension between Africa’s future and
past are negotiated now, and have been since independence.
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Part III: Writing The Nation
On February 5,1967 Julius Nyerere delivered one of the most important political
and philosophical statements of Africa’s modem era, the Arusha Declaration. In elegant
Swahili Nyerere outlined a vision for Tanzania, and Africa, that would cement his place
among the handful of leading lights in Africa’s nascent political firmament.119 Just over
two months later Mobutu Sese Seko delivered a French language articulation of African
political philosophy, outlining the ideology behind the Zairian state in a document he
called the N ’Sele Manifesto. Both documents attempted to bridge gaps between
nationalism and political universalism, but one was received with rapturous praise, the
other with a deafening silence. This section of the thesis intends to look more closely at
the ideas expressed in the Arusha Declaration and the N ’Sele Manifesto by placing key
ideas from each documents in comparison. The second part of this section will briefly
examine the implementation of these guiding documents in the context of each nation's
socio-political realities.
Analysis of the Arusha Declaration
Immediately after the Arusha Declaration was delivered it was heralded across the
world as a critical document in the development of a distinct African political philosophy.
Some called it a “clear and unequivocal rejection” of neocolonialism through economic
exploitation, and that an “Arusha disease.. .started a chain reaction” of liberationist
thought in the southern, white-minority ruled African states.120 Others called it a “radical

119 Shirley Graham Dubois in Julias Nyerere: Teacher o f Africa called it a “twentieth century Magna Carta”
(177).
120 A. K. Essack, "The Arusha Declaration," Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 8 (February 20, 1971):
488.
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break” with previously unsuccessful African attempts to forge a new destiny, and said it
provided a “vision of a different and better future” for many African nations, not just
Tanzania.121 C. L. R. James famously called it “the highest stage of resistance ever
reached by revolting Blacks.” 122 Even critics, like The Washington P o st’s Donald
Louchheim, said the Declaration provided “an immense psychological boost to
Nyerere’s .. .nation building.” 123 Despite accepting critique, and critiquing himself, on the
many failures of his leadership, Nyerere himself would say over three decades later,
“Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the Declaration is still valid:
I would not change a thing... The Arusha Declaration was what made Tanzania distinctly
Tanzania.” 124 What is in this document that was so heralded by so many?
As the Arusha Declaration begins, Nyerere described the document as being
“discussed and then published in Swahili.” 125 The emphasis on the process of discussion
rather than accepting sole authorship speaks to a powerful impulse in Nyerere’s
leadership style, one which impacts the rest of the document as well, towards decisions
being made by a group, rather than by an individual. Indeed, the relevance of community
in the life of the nation forms the bedrock o f the document. Beyond this the two major
themes in Arusha are the emphasis on self reliance, and Nyerere’s “deep concern for the

121 Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," Foreign Affairs 47, no. 3 (April 1969): 559.
122 Quoted in Ikaweba Bunting, "The Heart o f Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," The New
Internationalist, January/February 1999
123 Donald H. Louchheim, "Tanzania Facing Difficulties With Nationalized Economy," The Washington
P ost, February 27, 1967.
124 Bunting, “The Heart o f Africa.”
123 Nyerere, Ujamaa, 13.
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well-being of the poor, the peasants, and the workers.” 126 Initially the document outlines
generic principles of global socialism, describing the ideal society as one in which “every
worker obtains a just return for the labour he performs; and the incomes derived from
different types o f work are not grossly divergent.” 127 Beyond boilerplate socialist
•

•

*

principles such as this, Nyerere contextualizes his vision of political evolution
specifically for the Tanzanian context. Part of the way he achieves this is by critiquing
farm laborers, by a wide margin the largest class of worker in Tanzanian society:
Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage-eamer does. The truth is that
in the villages the women work very hard.. .Women who live in the villages o f Tanzania
work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages.. .are on
leave for half their lives. . . 128

The remaining content of the Arusha decleration provides a critique of money as
the basis of economy, the problems with excessive foreign aid, and the need for
•

’

Tanzanians to engage in “hard w ork.. .[which] is the meaning of self reliance.”

129

Nyerere’s desires for the nation, combined with reflections on the realities of the
challenges in front o f them, conclude the brief text.
Analysis of the N ’Sele Manifesto
The N ’Sele Manifesto was presented as the guiding document for M obutu’s
political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR). 130 As all other political
parties were outlawed at the time of the N ’Sele Manifesto’s production, this directly
126 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Tanzania under M walimu Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesm an (Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2006), 58.
127 Julius K. Nyerere. Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 15.
128 Ibid., 31.
129 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Tanzania under M walimu Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesman (Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2006), 55.
u’° This is most often translated into English as Popular Movement of the Revolution.
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elucidated official state doctrine. The document’s central thesis was provided in its
introduction: “The MPR wishes to make Zaire a genuinely independent country. Its
doctrine is Mobutuism.”131 The subsequent portions of the Manifesto address the ways in
which the MPR will “revolutionize” various elements of Zairian society including
education, the role of women in society, economics, the arts and youth culture, among
many others. Much o f the document contains vague language about how these changes
will occur, for example the suggestion that “The MPR affirms that all Zairians should be
able to profit from the goods of modem civilization.”132 Such vague proclamations about
“enhancing youth” and “protecting folklore” permeate the Manifesto, and very few
tangible statements about how specifically the MPR will achieve these goals were
offered.
The primary theme of the Amsha Declaration was self-reliance, and by contrast
the “N ’Sele Manifesto declared nationalism to be the doctrinal touchstone of the
MPR.”1 The obvious implication is that rather than relying on the people of the state to
elevate the nation, the people of Zaire were expected to rely on the party to elevate the
nation. The most important philosophical concept in the N ’Sele Manifesto is the concept
of “authenticity”.134 This doctrine, although ostensibly about maintaining African cultural
motifs in the modern era, really had more to do with an umbrella concept under which
such activities as the nationalization of foreign companies could be justified. Young and

ljl1 Zaire, Makanda Kabobi, M anifesto at N 'Sele, by Mobutu Sese Seko (N'Sele, 1967), 5.
L’2 Makanda Kabobi, N ’Sele, 13.
1.3 Young and Turner, Rise a n d Decline, 209.
1.4 While N ’Sele never uses the word “authenticite” explicity, its tenants are expounded and articulated
throughout the document in the guise of what Crawford Young and Thomas Turner call “authentic
Congolese nationalism.”
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Turner helpfully segment the nuanced development of authenticity as a central regime
construct as having three key phases:
From 1966 until about 1970, ‘authentic Congolese nationalism’ was the regime
motif. In 1971 this was eclipsed by an ambitious promotion of “authenticity” as a
philosophic innovation of the new order. In 1974, this in turn was supplanted by
1T^
‘Mobutuism.’
Despite these evolutionary changes, authenticity was purportedly about a return to
the African past from which Zairians drew their cultural power. Immediately after its
introduction the doctrine of authenticity came under internal critique for two primary
reasons: it engaged in “undue glorification of the past”, prominently espoused by
Catholic leaders, and due to “the vagueness of the creed,” a critique championed by
intellectuals.136 While much of M obutu’s sincerity as a political ideologist has been
rightly questioned, it is clear that Mobutu viewed the Manifesto, and its keystone concept
of “authenticity," as a move towards being taken seriously not just as a “leading political
figure, but also as a major thinker; this explains the decision to unveil ‘authenticity’ at a
congress of Senghor’s Union Porgressiste Senegalaise in Dakar rather than before a
home audience.”

i -j n

The clear implication is that Mobutu was attempting to position

himself as a continental political thinker and philosopher, not merely a masterful political
figure; undoubtedly, his desire to do so had much to do with Nyerere’s prominence and
his perceived place in the hierarchy of African political thinkers. However, unlike
Nyerere, Mobutu did not have a cache of international intellectual goodwill that would
enable his Manifesto to be heralded, or even taken seriously. Thus, in 1973 when “a
major international colloquim was announced” at which intellectuals from around the
1:0 Young and Turner, Rise and D ecline, 208.
136 Ibid., 212.
137 Ibid., 210.
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globe were expected to “acclaim and elaborate authenticity,” no prominent intellectuals
could be enticed to attend, and after two postponements, this legitimizing effort was
abandoned.138
Connecting the Texts
Even with cursory examination it is clear that the N ’Sele Manifesto is highly
derivative of the Arusha Declaration. Using a “founding” document to articulate a party
platform, as Nyerere had done with TANU in the Arusha Declaration, was the motif of
N ’Sele as well. Major themes of critiquing capitalism’s inadequacy in the African
context, the need for a mobilization of human capital, and the need for comprehensive
reform in all aspects o f national life read very similarly in the two texts. One interesting
connection, in the light of history, is that both texts advocate for the liberation of white minority dominated southern African states. While the Arusha Declaration only contains
a one line pledge to “co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the
liberation of all Africa,” the N ’Sele Manifesto goes into much greater detail. 139 The
manifesto specifically mentions Rhodesia as deserving concerted focus and effort from
all “liberated” African states to achieve independence— Rhodesia being the nation of
most interest and international attention at the time on issues of African majority-led
governance.140 As the next section will reveal, Mobutu and Nyerere wound up on either
side of the liberation struggles in South Africa, but this divergence was not revealed in
these documents.

l ,s Young and Turner, Rise a n d Decline, 212.
ly; Makanda Kabobi, N ’Sele, 28-29.
140 Ibid., 29.

47

There are certainly dramatic differences between the texts as well. The final
resolutions articulated in Arusha regard the behavior of the leaders of the party. Calls to
radical accountability, relative poverty, and a total freedom from corruption are
powerfully articulated in Nyerere's Declaration, and he personally took the commitment
to simplicity and incorruptibility to heart. Despite vague claims about fair representation
and avoiding personal enrichment, nothing in the N ’Sele Manifesto speaks to the
accountability of party leadership, or demands responsibility in the use of power.141
Also, Nyerere’s Zanaki heritage, and its aforementioned acephelous leadership structure,
by nature presumed that leadership through consensus building was not only functional
but also elegant and powerful. Mobutu also claimed a connection to “traditional”
leadership to justify his own political structure, but with the opposite purpose. “In our
African tradition, there are never two chiefs... [and] after having taken counsel and
informed himself, he must decide and resolve the issue alone, in full cognizance of the
problem.” 142 In this trajectory these documents have remarkable different objects.
On the most basic level, Arusha can be construed as a document dedicated to
promulgating “self-reliance.” 143 N ’Sele, on the other hand, is a document devoted to
instructing the populace to rely on the MPR and its “guide” Mobutu. 144 The document
even promises that the MPR will “liberate Zairian men and women from all subjugation

141 Ibid., 11.
142 Quoted in Young and Turner's Rise and Decline on page 211, but is originally from Mobutu: Discours,
allucutions, m essages et 7965-1975 (Paris: Editions J.A., 1975) 2: 100-101
14j Indeed, the preamble and the conclusion both focus on the objects of reliance traditionally used in
Tanzania: money and society, as the primary fork in the decision tree.
!44 The entire document uses the state as the agent o f action in the text.
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and assure their progress by promoting a truly social and truly democratic republic.”145
This claim, which burdens the state with all the responsibility for liberating the populace,
is an effective encapsulation of the tone and sentiment of the larger document. N'Sele
further quashes individual action by warning "that individual liberties may lead to
anarchy, [so] the authority of the regime" could not be challenged.146 Despite these
differences, it is clear that the idea of a seminal "founding text" as presented in the
Arusha Declaration was just what Mobutu was after. This was not the first time Mobutu
had sought to emulate Nyerere, nor would it be the last.
One anecdotal example o f M obutu’s desire to follow Nyerere's lead was
embodied in the costume known as the abacost. From the declaration of “authenticity” in
1967 until the “Third Republic” political liberalizations of 1990, Zairian men were
required by law to wear the abacost instead of westem-style suits. The dress itself,
however, was not a product of M obutu’s vision of an “authentic” society, rather it was
borrowed from the wardrobe of Julius Nyerere. This simple, plain suit was worn by
Nyerere throughout his time in leadership and until the end of his life. Inspired by the
fashion of the egalitarian Chinese and the Indian nationalist Nehru, Nyerere adopted the
suit as an alternative to western suits, and also as a way to indicate his connection to the
average Tanzanian.147 Ironically in Zaire, “the poor could not afford to equip their
wardrobe with this garb, which soon became a sartorial symbol of class, rather than an
articulation of national identity.” 148 Abacost wearers were “politicians [in the] top

145 Zaire, Makanda Kabobi, M anifesto at N 'Sele, by Mobutu Sese Seko (N'Sele, 1967), 8.
146 Kevin C. Dunn, Im agining the Congo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1 14.
147 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nyerere a n d Africa: E nd o f an Era (New York: New Africa Press, 2006), 507.
148 Young and Turner, Rise and D ecline, 1 17.
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cadres... owners o f Mercedes cars.” 149 In both societies the abacost was a class symbol,
but in Tanzania it was a class leveler, in Zaire it became the costume of privilege. This
dichotomy is also true of these documents. The N'Sele Manifesto was not widely read,
not least because relatively few Zairians could read French by 1967, but served as
something of an ego stroke for those already in the cadre in power in Zaire. The Arusha
Declaration, on the other hand, was widely distributed in both Swahili and English, and
became a touchstone text for many around the continent, and the world, to engage with
and be empowered by. The founding texts themselves, like the abacost, was not
important because o f the form, which was shared, but because of what filled it, which
was not. Even though the N ’Sele Manifesto was meant to be the “basis of the obligatory
instruction in civics in all the schools in the country” it's message was not widely
received or understood.150 Like most other social constructs in Mobutu’s Zaire, education
became a tool for leverage. Eventually, a university education “became necessary (but
not sufficient) for entry” into the elite of society.151 Thus, parroting truths of the N'Sele
manifesto, like the abacost, was simply another marker for someone wanting to enter the
elite classes of society, not a set of truths which would guide the construction of a nation.
Another similarity in the outcomes of the documents was the nationalizations of
industry which were justified by N ’Sele and Arusha. American newspapers strongly
connected the ideological documents with the pragmatics of nationalization.

152

The

149 Ibid., 132.
130 Michael G. Schatzberg, "Fidelite au Guide: The J.M.P.R. in Zairian Schools," The Journal o f Modern
African Studies 16, no. 3 (September 1978)
131 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 136.
132 The New York Times, "Tanzania on Road to Rural Socialism," January 26, 1968.
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Arusha Decleration especially makes clear the "centrality of state control of the
economy" in Tanzania.

1ST

The disastrous nationalization of agriculture in Tanzania,

probably Nyerere's worst tactical mistake in his presidency, was borne of ideas first
espoused in the Arusha Declaration.154
Conclusions
As “Zaire” has been erased from maps, and “Congo” has taken its place, so the
N ’Sele Manifesto has dissipated totally from the Congolese national consciousness,
although it seems never to have gained purchase in the first place. "Authenticity" proved
to be a doctrine which was as ephemeral and ultimately meaningless as anything else
ideologically proffered by M obutu’s regime. It is telling that some of the first moves of
the post-Mobutu regime were to rename the country, taking the name originally provided
by Leopold II, rather than maintain the nomenclature of the Mobutu regime; such was the
failure o f Zaire as an idea.155
Arusha persists, now seen more as a philosophical text produced by a "radical
thinker" than a legitimate political system.156 Nyerere's Pan-Africanism gains more
credence even as his model of civic life in Tanzania fades, and historians contest the
merits of his presidency. To Nyerere, however, the Arusha Declaration was meant to be

153 KLjell J. Havnevik, Tanzania: The Limits to D evelopm ent fro m Above (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, 1993), 43.
154 Nyerere himself admitted as much later in life. He articulates this failing especially clearly in Ikaweba
Bunting, "The Heart o f Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," The New Internationalist, January/February
1999. "
1x5 Nicholas Kristoff, "In Congo, a New Era With Old Burdens," The New York Times, May 20, 1997.
156 Indeed it is featured in Anthony Bogues' "Julius Nyerere: Radical African Humanism, Equality, and
Decolonization," in Black Heretics, B lack Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New York: Routledge,
2003).
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something embedded in Tanzanian society’s DNA— not something that he put there, but
something he found which was there already.157 The reality of this hope, and whether
Nyerere's legacy in Tanzania continues to inspire its people, remains to be seen.
The use of language in each national project also connects to this thesis' larger
theme of limited contextual determinism in each leader's political policies. Neither leader
altered language policies inherited from the colonial administrations dramatically.
Nyerere's implementation of Swahili was certainly more nuanced and influential than
Mobutu's usage of Lingala, but the language themselves evolved rather than were
transformed, or even replaced, during the transition to independence. There were
logistical considerations, or course, in addition to the ideological benefits of maintaining
a colonial and "African" language in these new states, but as this section intended to
demonstrate: the uses and implementations of language in each context dramatically
impacted the success o f each nationalization project.

1:>7 This comes out in the Ikaweba Bunting interview, see citation 154 above.
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Part IV. Zaire, Tanzania and the U.S. in the Cold War Context
"When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers."
Gikuyu proverb 158

On the morning o f August 9, 1974, as Richard Nixon, who only moments before
had been President o f the United States, awkwardly waved his V-shaped fingers in the
air, a rogue’s smile on his weathered face, and boarded Navy One for the last time, Henry
Kissinger remained behind in the White House. Indeed, just under the massive headline
"NIXON RESIGNS" on the.front page of that day's New York Times ran the sub-heading
'"Sacrifice' is Praised; Kissinger to Remain." 160 Such was the association between these
men. That immortal V salute signaled the death rattle of the "painfully excruciating"

158 Eric Walters and Adrian Bradbury, When Elephants Fight (Victoria, B.C.: Orca Book Publishers, 2008).
This is likely, in fact, an apocryphal quotation, but it is also probably the most famous o f the so-called
"African proverbs."
159 Ollie Atkins, N ixon departs, August 9, 1974, Washington, D.C.,
http://www.judiciaryreport.com/images/Richard-Nixon-Helicopter.jpg (accessed June 11, 2010).
160 John Herbers, "Nixon Resigns," The New York Times, August 8, 1974.
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national experience that was the collapse of the Nixon years.161 Kissinger remained, and
inherited much of the nation’s pent up anger with Nixon and with the government in
general. The nation was raw with feelings of self-doubt in the wake of the Vietnam
debacle and the moral collapse of the Presidency. While Gerald Ford entered office
largely free of the dirt that Nixon would never wash away, it was undoubtedly Kissinger
who was the intellect behind the last vestiges of the Nixon White House, and it was only
Kissinger who had any chance of redeeming, at least partially, one of the most humiliated
executives in American history and, by proxy, himself.
Meanwhile, thousands of miles away in Africa a new hot phase of the Cold War
was developing. Freshly independent African nations were aligning and re-aligning
themselves with the great powers, leveraging the behemoths against each other in service
to their own nationalistic visions. The last major hold-outs of white minority rule- South
Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Southwest Africa- faced increasing foreign,
domestic, and intra-African pressure to allow black majority-rule. Within this context,
Julius Nyerere and Mobutu Sese Seko were seeking ways to quell, or at least distract,
domestic dissidents and gain influence and relevance in the region.162 In 1976 these three
instrumental leaders, Nyerere, Mobutu and Kissinger would converge through diplomatic
engagement around the Angolan Civil War conflict. Through these interactions a
microcosm of the way Cold War diplomacy was carried out by the United States on the
continent of Africa was generated.

161 Stephen W. Stathis, "Nixon, Watergate, and American Foreign Policy," Presidential Studies Quarterly
33, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 129.
162 The country o f Belgium has accepted responsibility for the slaying, and the 1979 Church Report
recognized formal American involvement in the assassination plot. Larry Devlin, the CIA Station Chief at
the time reported in his book C h ie f o f Station, Congo that Eisenhower had ordered him to kill Lumumba by
poisoning, but because o f a moment o f moral vacillation, the Belgians got to him first through Mobutu.
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The intention of this section, then, is to specifically examine the triad relationship
between Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. Secretary of State, the President of Tanzania
Julius Nyerere, and the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko. This will be examined
through two lenses. The first engages the broader history of U.S. involvement in Africa
during the Cold War, and situates the importance of these three men in the broader
historical context. The second section explores the personal as political— looking through
Kissinger’s eyes at these two men, and asking questions of these relationships and the
ways tensions between reality and the ideal played out during Kissinger’s trip to Africa in
1976.
America in Africa
American involvement in African affairs began prior to the formal existence of
the United States. The dubious origin of this relationship can be traced to the moment that
the first Africans were sold into slavery in Jamestown in 1619.163 A massive importation
of African slave labor followed. This forced migration across the notorious Middle
Passage ultimately impacted American history in the most profound ways possible, even
to the point of bringing the Union to the brink of destruction. Even after the end of
slavery Africa and America maintained a complex, unequal relationship— a relationship
which continues to this day.
During Africa's colonial period America’s influence was obvious. While America
received no formal African holdings during the Scramble beyond its extant connection to

163 Alden T. Vaughn, "Blacks in Virginia: A Note on the First Decade," The William & Mary Quarterly 29,
no. 3 (July 1972): 470.
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the “independent” Liberia,164 the United States sanctioned the partition of the continent
and had powerful economic interests in the region long before and after 1895. The rising
American demand for consumer goods, and the subsequent demand for the raw materials
required to produce them, became much of the impetus behind European colonial
extractive economics in the African colonies. After independence, however, American
interest in African affairs abated as other concerns like Vietnam and domestic political
strife pulled attention inward. The U.S. was also dealing with the expansion of the Cold
War's tentacles in other parts of the world. This brief period of ignoring Africa would end
soon after Navy One flew Richard Nixon into permanent political exile, and Henry
Kissinger turned his attention to Southern Africa.165
This section will shift the focus of this paper westward, not to remove attention
from the key figures at the heart o f this thesis, but to explore these men through the eyes
of the most powerful nation in the world in the late 1970s. This is possible because of
nature of Kissinger himself. Because of the complexity of his motives, the prominence of
his power and the contested nature o f his legacy, Kissinger can be viewed as something

164 Liberia is complex to classify on the continuum o f colonial project vs. independent African state.
American involvement begins with the migration project o f African ex-slaves “back to Africa” culminating
in Liberian independence in 1847, a move which can be construed as an American colonial action
conducted by Afro-descended Americans, as they clearly established their governance as an elite over
indigenous peoples o f the region. The color o f the skin o f the “colonizers” complicates the conventional
colonial narrative, but had these initial settlers happened to be white, Liberia would certainly have been
classified as a colonial project orchestrated by Americans.
165 As we circle back to Kissinger, and use his writings in much o f this section, it is appropriate to ask if
there has been a more discussed American diplomat than Henry Kissinger? It would be difficult for any
other potential candidate to match Kissinger's prodigious writings on his own diplomatic career— his three
volume set concerning his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations comes in at over 3,500 pages. This
says nothing about the many volumes others have written on the man, his policies, psychology and
influence. Kissinger is so discussed and dissected precisely because he functions as something of a
Rorschach test for the American public. Equally despised and admired by neo-conservatives, liberals,
centrists, idealists and realists alike, Kissinger is a proxy for all manner o f American perceptions o f failings
and successes in foreign policy. Certainly no figure has dominated the discussion o f American foreign
policy in the last quarter o f the 20,h century more than the Harvard-trained immigrant.
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of a proxy for the United States. Because of this he proves a useful figure to follow in
order to examine two of Africa’s most influential leaders in the late 1970s, Julius Nyerere
of Tanzania, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.166
The Frying Pan and the Fire: Angola in the Shadow of Vietnam

This famous image seemed to capture in one frame the chaos that permeated the
American withdrawal from Saigon, and continues to dominate the national memory of
the end stages of the Vietnam War. The image symbolized that the dawning national
realization that in Vietnam terror had triumphed over reason. This irrational fear was
played out by the dozens of people trying to get on that last helicopter, frantically trying
to escape from “the one clear failure in American military history.” 168 The image distilled
the humiliating withdrawal process for which Kissinger endured much critique. These
raw feelings of failure and frustration, coupled with the national shame and anger
associated with Nixon’s Watergate implosion, left Kissinger in a delicate position as Ford

166 Indeed, Kissinger himself told a meeting o f members o f Congress that Zaire “is a very rich country and
could be the keystone to political and economic progress in Africa” and that Tanzania was the “ intellectual
leader o f Southern Africa.” - From the MOC, Bipart Congress, May 12, 1976.
167 Hubert Van Es, Vietnam Airlift, April 29, 1975, Saigon, Vietnam. Universal Press International.
168 Chalres Mohr, "History and Hindsight: Lessons From Vietnam," The N ew York Times, April 30, 1985.
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took office. America was experiencing “emotional exhaustion” and self doubt, and the
presidency seemed less austere and transcendent than at any other point in history.169
It had been so different only a few years before. Kissinger became a major
political force during his time in the Nixon White House. Scholars like Jussi Hanhimaki
have suggested that Nixon even “lost the struggle for the limelight to Kissinger” during
his own presidency. 170 By the end of Nixon’s time in office, it was Kissinger, not Nixon,
who was “the leading policy maker” in the administration.171 Had Nixon left office under
remarkably different circumstances Kissinger's prominence could have immortalized him
among the most important and influential cabinet members in U.S. history, but instead his
place in a scandal-ridden administration deeply tainted his reputation as the executive
branch imploded under the weight of Nixon’s indiscretions. Finding a major policy
victory under Ford then became vital for Kissinger’s personal rehabilitation, as well as
the self-concept o f the embittered country. It was during this crucial time in the life of the
nation and his personal career that Kissinger turned his gaze to Angola.
By November o f 1975 Ford had been President for just over a year, and continued
Nixon’s “policy of supporting Portuguese control of Angola and Mozambique, feeling
that it represented the best possibility for stability in Southern Africa." 172 This tactic
dovetailed with the American policy of publicly criticizing and privately supporting

169 Henry A. Kissinger, "Lessons for an Exit Strategy," August 12, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.eom/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/l 1/AR2005081101756.html (accessed
May 11, 2010).
170 Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The F law ed Architect: H enry Kissinger and Am erican Foreign Policy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 291.
171 Ibid., 292.
172 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 686.
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white minority rule in Southern Africa. Part of the reason for this seemingly incoherent
policy in Southern Africa was that “before 1975 Kissinger paid little attention to political
developments in Africa.” 173 A coherent foreign policy was not possible in a region that
received no attention from the Secretary of State. Kissinger was certainly not alone in this
disinterest. Africa was not viewed as an American “problem” and seemed to possess little
strategic relevance to America’s broader foreign policy interests. This view changed
dramatically in late 1975.
The catalyzing event to pull America’s gaze to Southern and Central Africa was
Angolan independence, which formally occurred on November 11, 1975. This happened
amidst rising political fears about the future of Angola that were triggered by a
convergence of political and economic concerns, both international and domestic, which
surrounded which "way" Angola would ultimately go. Within the broader Cold War
context, Angola looked to be a new front in the proxy hot war between the USSR and the
United States. White-minority led nations like Rhodesia and South Africa did not want
Angola to become a leftist state, as it would inevitably serve as a base for liberation
movements against them. These concerns and a complex of other factors led to the
explosion of violence in Angola in 1975.
First, the Carnation Revolution, which culminated in April of 1974, ended the
dictatorship in Portugal and the leaders of the new junta pushed for rapid decolonization
and democratization within former Portuguese foreign territories, especially in Africa.174

173 Jeremi Suri, H enry K issinger a n d the A m erican Century (Cambridge: Belknap Press o f Harvard
University Press, 2007), 237.
174 There were many reasons for the push for decolonization, but certainly a factor was the cost to the
treasury to maintain colonial holdings. The desperately poor nation spent approximately 40 percent of its
national budget on quelling African freedom fighters in Mozambique and Angola in 1974.
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The vacuum left by the sudden withdrawal of Portuguese forces and political leaders,
combined with the remaining presence of the black Angolan groups who were in the
process o f fighting the Portuguese for freedom, meant factionalized, armed Angolan
forces were left to determine who would run the newly free nation. There were three
main factions which emerged from this period. The MPLA, a leftist group backed by the
USSR and Cuba came to control the formal government and Luanda after
independence.175 The FNLA under Holden Roberto became the primary group backed by
6
the United States and its allies, especially Zaire. 1 7 Finally
in the south of Angola was a
*

*

group called UNITA under Jonas Savimibi, also backed by the United States but to a
lesser extent than the FNLA.177 These groups emerged as opposing powers immediately
after independence and the nation was plunged into civil conflict that would continue for
16 years. Seeing the potential for Angola to go “either way,” and the relevance of the
state to broader Southern African politics, both the United States and the Soviets began
supporting various factions in the conflict. 178 Primarily the U.S. used its regional proxy,
Zaire, to supply and train the forces under Holden Roberto in the FNLA, but also
supported UNITA, who drew support from South Africa, another ally of the United
States in the region.

175 MPLA stands for M ovim ento P opular de Libertagao de Angola or Popular Movement for the Liberation
o f Angola.
176 FNLA stands for Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola, or the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola.
177 UNITA stands for Unido N acional para a Independencia Total de A ngola or the National Union for the
Total Independence o f Angola.
178 Ultimately it was Cuba, however, who provided the M PLA with the most military and economic aid
during the Angolan conflict, particularly in the early years o f the fighting.
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Beyond global politics, the situation in Angola, and the world of Henry Kissinger,
the mid-1970s had also been hard on Julius Nyerere and Mobutu Sese Seko. Nyerere had
overseen steady economic growth in Tanzania in the late 60s, emerging from principles
elucidated in the Arusha Declaration, and enjoyed much early success in his ujamaa
socio-political program. In the early ‘70s Nyerere’s economic and social policies looked
to be bearing fruit, and his vision of societal reinvention by being true to “African
traditions” seemed to be succeeding. However, in the mid-1970’s forced “villagization”
of the rural populace, increasingly corrupt lower-level leadership, years of drought, the
1973 oil crisis, and disastrous nationalizations of business substantially weakened the
state.179 Nyerere was in danger o f losing power and relevance in the region, and saw in
the Southern African liberation movements a situation of personal concern to him which
also would allow him to re-assert regional influence and power even as domestic
problems grew.
As acknowledged by Zaire experts like Crawford Young, Mobutu Sese Seko
enjoyed public support through rising to power and asserting political stability after a
tumultuous, violent five year period following independence in 1960. 180 His subsequent
moves toward dictatorship, like banning all political opposition, were not widely
criticized because the consolidation of power seemed to herald even more years of
national stability. The people of Zaire were also ready for a definitive end to the internal
ethnic and political divisions inevitable in a country the size of Western Europe which
contained over 200 ethnic groups. However, things began to collapse for Mobutu around
179 For more on this, especially the crises early in the decade see John Iliffe, A M odern History o f
Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1999).
180 Young and Turner, Rise a n d Decline, 220.
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the same time as Tanzania began slipping into economic trouble. Similar factors like the
oil crisis, regional drought and growing political pressures related to Cold War
escalations impacted Zaire. The biggest factor in Mobutu’s weakening position, however,
was the precipitous decline of copper prices in the early ‘70s. After years of continually
increasing in value, copper prices fell 18% from 1974-1975, and did not recover for over
three years. 181 The economic engine of Zairian society was in the Copper Belt region,
called Shaba, and the decline in revenue from that region precipitated something of a
national economic meltdown. Mobutu sought an external distraction to draw focus from
the economic collapse, and also believed that a friendly government in Angola would
lead to cheaper export costs for copper through Angolan rail lines.
Kissinger, Nyerere and Mobutu all needed success in Angola for their own
futures. Despite Angola’s previous irrelevance in geo-politics, these three powerful men
had personal, political and foreign policy problems which looked like they could be
solved by a major success in Angola. Each had differing conceptions of what that success
would look like, but the potential for collaboration existed between these men, and
ultimately it was Kissinger who would be the connection between them all.
Kissinger: Recollections and Inventions
Kissinger went to Africa with a sympathetic ear for the concerns of leading
African statesmen as part of his “new willingness to use moralism as a foreign policy
tool.” 1182 He signaled his intent, and new-found commitment to black majority rule, in his
departure statement where “he spoke of the ‘commitment of the U.S. to majority rule in
181 Porter, K. E., and D. L. Edelstein. ’’Copper Statistics: U.S. Geological Survey.” Report. U.S. Geological
Survey, 2009.
l82Isaacson, Kissinger: A B iography, 686.
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the black African countries.’” 183 This new moral commitment meant that he needed to
treat Nyerere with particular respect as he was “key to any solution” to the troubles
embroiling Southern Africa.184 Nyerere’s instrumentality was not borne of his country’s
political prominence, but because of Nyerere’s moral and intellectual preeminence
throughout the region.
Almost immediately upon arriving in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Kissinger seemed
seduced by Julius Nyerere, saying he found him “graceful and elegant, his eyes sparkling,
his gestures fluid,” and because he possessed an “awesome command of the English
language... Nyerere could be a seductive interlocutor.” 185 In a different context this kind
of language could have been the words o f schoolboy to a crush. Indeed, at a parade early
in his visit to Tanzania, Kissinger recalled sitting "beside Nyerere in the presidential box.
He looked cool and elegant in a light gray bush suit. I felt clumsy and uncomfortable in
my blue pinstriped diplomat’s uniform.” 186 To recall so acutely some 23 years later a
feeling of personal inadequacy when placed in contrast with Nyerere reveals the intensity
with which Kissinger was struck by the man. More remarkable is that this powerful
moment did not occur.
As the photograph below indicates, Kissinger was not sitting next to Nyerere at
the parade in question; in fact, Nyerere oversaw the parade from a podium on the parade

183 Ibid., 687.
184 Henry Kissinger, Years o f R enew al (N ew York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 932.
183 Ibid.
186 Ibid., 935.
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grounds (seen in the background of the image below) and only afterward met with
Kissinger in a private room for conversation and discussion:

mmm

187

mmm

Further vividly recalled details by Kissinger, such as a patronizing recollection of
Tanzanians soldiers unintentionally hurling off sandals during attempts to goosestep, are
belied by previously unreleased photographic evidence of the event. 189 Here are the
supposedly sandal-clad troops:

187 A ccording to archivists at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, these photographs taken by W hite
House photographer Ricardo Thom as during K issinger’s trip to Africa have never been review ed by
another researcher nor have they been published in any context, therefore it is highly likely Kissinger has
never seen them, nor does he perhaps have any know ledge o f their existence. Ricardo Thomas was the first
A frican-A m erican W hite House photographer.
188 Ricardo Thom as, photographer. “K issinger’s Trip to A frica.” From the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library, photograph taken in 1976. This man is unnamed in the photographic docum entation, but appears to
have been a high official in N yerere's government.
189 This tale, which, again, is undoubtedly false based on photographs o f the event, is found on page 935 o f
Years o f Renewal. Any attem pt to determine the purpose o f the fabrication is obviously guesswork, but it
seems to indicate a kind o f psychological gam esm anship Kissinger conducted: if he was personally less
impressive than Nyerere, at least the nation he represented had a sophistication that could only be crudely
imitated by N yerere’s people.
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These lapses in memory, or intentional fabrications, are not mere trivialities that
can be chalked up to the vagaries of time. They reveal something interesting about the
psychology of Kissinger. The man prided himself on his mental acuity, and these
anecdotes o f foreign adventures are just the kind of thing Kissinger routinely brought out
at parties to impress guests. Kissinger’s tale of personal embarrassment sitting next to the
elegant Nyerere speaks to the fact that Kissinger was indeed impressed, perhaps even
intimidated, by the Tanzanian leader. However, how can these moments where the
“facts” according to Kissinger do not comply with recorded images of these events be
understood? Do these inaccuracies or fabrications belie Kissinger’s other contentions
about this trip to Africa specifically?
Few would contest the fact that Kissinger possessed genius-level political skills,
and given the effort Kissinger has put into “correcting” the record of his time in
government, his own writings on his career must be read with some suspicion. Kissinger
must have been aware that including detail enhances the believability of a story. Using

190 Ricardo Thomas, photographer. “K issinger’s Trip to Africa.” From the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library, photograph taken in 1976.
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these vivid moments of personal observation to frame political discussions allowed
Kissinger space to “own” the context surrounding important political discourse, and is
meant to reveal his command of the past, especially when there are few present to contest
him.191 The problem comes when these detailed recollections are proved false. If
Kissinger is incorrect about a moment of personal anguish, why would he be significantly
more accurate about the intricacies of multi-hour conversation with a leader he had never
met before? Kissinger’s account, while overall worthwhile and certainly useful, must be
examined with some suspicion in the light of this emerging documentation.
Whatever was behind the complex feelings Kissinger had for Nyerere, and his
decision to obfuscate the record of their interactions, he obviously had a low opinion of
Mobutu. Kissinger never mentions anything of Mobutu’s personal charisma, and viewed
Zaire in instrumental terms, perceiving Mobutu as something of an American
functionary, doing largely what he was told. M obutu’s predilection for gauche opulence
rubbed Kissinger the wrong way as well; Kissinger said his accommodations in Zaire
“never managed to cross the line from the ostentatious to the attractive.” 192 Nor was he
wowed by M obutu’s fleet of vehicles or private zoo, though he appeared impressed while
touring it with Mobutu who proudly displayed his totemic animal: the leopard.

191 Julius Nyerere died in 1999, the year that Years o f Renewal, from which this account is taken, was
published.
192 Kissinger, Years o f R enew al, 942.
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The unflattering feelings Kissinger had for Mobutu extended to his perception of
M obutu’s political policies as well. Where Nyerere was seen as a worthy opponent, who
differed with Kissinger on an ideological level, Mobutu’s pragmatic sense was largely
devoted to generating “the ostentation he so clearly enjoyed to establish himself an aura
of overwhelming power and majesty.” 194 Mobutu thus presented much less of a challenge
politically and subsequently warranted less attention from Kissinger than other potential
enemies did. By 1976 Mobutu had proved himself to be the ultimate ally of the United
States in the region, and as early as the summer of 1975 the United States was planning
interventions into Angola through Zaire, and was training U.S.-backed FNLA troops
using “North Korean military instructors based in Zaire.” 195
By the time Kissinger readied to leave Zaire he literally felt sick to his stomach.
The likely culprit for the ailment was the “wild boar and manioc plants” he had dined on

i9j Ricardo Thomas, photographer. “K issinger’s Trip to A frica.” From the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library, photograph taken in 1976.
194 Kissinger, Years o f Renewal, 945.
195 Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 676.
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the previous evening.196 Perhaps another source of unease in the Secretary’s bowels was
the intractability of the opposing parties in the Southern African context. On one side
were the moral opponents to white minority rule, led by Julius Nyerere. On the other
were the whites themselves. Somewhere in between stood proxies like Mobutu.
Indeed, some o f the headaches faced by Kissinger on the Africa trip emanated
from his attempts to work with all sides of the South African liberation issue. Nyerere
repeatedly denounced the racist regimes in Southern Africa in speech and print. The
South African whites told Kissinger in private that Nyerere brought Chinese operatives to
Tanzania to “train terrorists” for action Rhodesia.197 Despite these conflicting pressures
Kissinger was very willing to apply intense pressure to the white leaders of Southern
Africa’s minority led governments. Ian Smith, the leader of Rhodesia, said that Kissinger
was trying to “Get me to sign my suicide note,” by advocating for black majority rule in
the nation.

1Q&

Kissinger’s gastronomic challenges passed and he went back to

Washington, ready to push American involvement in Southern Africa to a degree never
before considered.
As he left, the usefulness of the United States to Nyerere and Mobutu became
clearer to each man. Kissinger felt that “Nyerere wanted to 'borrow [America’s] power,'
as he expressed it to me some months later, to help bring majority rule to southern Africa
and to expel the white minorities influence in the aftermath.... To Nyerere, the United

196 The Victoria A dvocate (Victoria, Texas), "Stomach Ache Idles Kissinger," April 27, 1976, 12C sec.
197 MOC. June 23, 1976. With SA leaders. Page 7.
198 Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 690.
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States was a weapon to be employed to accelerate the liberation struggle.199 Nyerere was
not alone in viewing American foreign policy in Africa in the late 1970s in militarized
terms. Mobutu also saw the U.S. as a gateway to military power— correctly it turns out.
Even Kissinger saw American diplomacy in Angola as carrying with it the heft of
military power, through proxies, of course.
Ultimately Kissinger returned from Africa with the situation there almost exactly
where it had been when he arrived on the continent. Black majority rule and white
minority rule were not political ideologies which could be brought into compromise. The
potential cataclysmic violence which could spring from power vacuums created by white
flight from these nations was being displayed in Angola. Angola also represented a key
region for Kissinger to demonstrate American muscularity in foreign policy through
forces backed by the U.S.’s proxy in the region: Zaire. Despite Kissinger's repeated
promises to support black majority rule, the final racist regime in the region, South
Africa, did not collapse until 1994, almost twenty years after Kissinger’s continental
jaunt. What were the real outcomes of the trip then?
In order to get at what Kissinger thought happened on his trip to Africa, it is
useful to examine conversations Kissinger and Ford had about the situation in Southern
Africa immediately after his trip. Here we can see the back room considerations and
maneuvers Kissinger came away from the trip understanding, and the way the public
message Kissinger and Ford presented regarding the situation there was modified from
their private understandings of the context of Southern Africa. Kissinger saw Zaire as not
only a military ally which could help bring about American policy goals in Angola, but as
a potential model of American-African relations to the rest of the continent. In a meeting
199 Kissinger, Years o f Renewal, 93 1.
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with Ford he said, “If we could make a couple of countries showcases, we would be
doing great. It won't take all that much—$100 million for Zaire.”200 He also told Ford that
“we do have to make a major effort in Zaire. Mobutu says he has to have tanks
psychologically because Angola has them.”

90 1

Clearly Kissinger, despite positive

personal feelings about Nyerere, recognized the deep strategic importance of Zaire to
U.S. designs in Southern Africa. It is also interesting that Kissinger and Mobutu
discussed the psychological impact of U.S. support, and were, in some ways, recreating a
mini-Cold War arms escalation between Mobutu's forces and the forces of the MPLA in
Angola.
Despite these private conversations with Ford, Kissinger told a group of members
of Congress two days later that “Tanzania is politically the most influential country in
this region right now,” and that “Tanzania is the intellectual leader of Southern Africa
and as
such is the key to the future of the area.”202 Further he said of Zaire that “its leaders are
really not too interested in Southern African matters.” 203 He knew this was not the case:
Mobutu was continually asking the U.S. for greater military investment in forces based in
Zaire who were making war in Angola, but beyond this, Zaire was interested in Southern
African matters because the United States was. Days earlier Kissinger told Ford that
Zaire was the political key to Angola.

200 MOC, M ay 10, 1976, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Ford. W hite House. From Ford Library. Page 1.
201 MOC, May 9, 1976, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Ford. W hite House. From Ford Library. Page 1.
202 M em oranda o f Conversation, M ay 12, 1976, Kissinger, Ford, Bipart Mem o f Congress. The Cabinet
Room, White House. From Ford Library. Page 2.
203 Ibid.
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Obviously, Kissinger and Ford recognized that on a pragmatic level, Zaire was the
essential nation in Africa for the United States to enact its policies. In public, however,
Kissinger routinely praised Tanzania and Nyerere, clearly knowing that this was the best
way to earn some points for liberation-minded Africans across the continent. The
documentary evidence is, unfortunately, lacking on the inverse perspective: what was it
that Nyerere and Mobutu felt about their foreign interlocutor? Nyerere wrote prolifically,
but preferred the philosophical and political to the memoir. Mobutu, other than a concern
with regime mythology rarely spoke or wrote on his own life, and kept his political
dealings very close to the chest, as he must have to have remained an island of power in
the maelstrom of Congo for so many years.
Conclusions
Examining the 1976 visit of Henry Kissinger to Africa, and the context
surrounding it, reveals several important aspects of American foreign policy in Africa
around the Cold War. First, it clearly shows that Africa was not a relevant concern of
U.S. foreign policy prior to 1975. Other than manipulating Zairian politics to prevent the
massive nation from joining the Soviet bloc, the U.S. had a hands off, disinterested
approach to African affairs. Kissinger’s visit changed that. From 1976 on, especially
through the Angolan conflict, the United States took an active role in exerting diplomatic
power, and occasionally military force (as in Somalia), across Africa, and actively
worked against those nations which the United States did not see as benefiting its
strategic interests.
Second, Kissinger’s obfuscation of African realities connects well to the
American tendency to patronize African politics. As recently as 1994 America threw up
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its hands and refused to become involved in the Rwandan genocide, claiming that the
Hutu-Tutsi conflict was part of an ancient feud between the groups. This is roundly
rejected by scholars as even the solid construction of these ethnic groups coincided with
Belgian control of the states of Rwanda and Burundi in 1908.204
Kissinger’s unique mix of idealism and realism brought his, and subsequently
America’s, gaze onto African affairs. The legacy of this attention is yet to be determined,
but the impact of U.S. involvement in the Angolan Civil War, which was solidified on
that trip, has dramatic and horrific consequences for thousands of people in Angola
today.
Ultimately, a great deal was at stake for each o f the major players in this
Kissinger-Mobutu-Nyerere triad. Kissinger felt pressure to salvage something of the
Nixon presidency, particularly with regard to foreign policy, through diplomatic and
martial interventions in Southern Africa. Nyerere was positioning himself as Pan-African
leader, and felt personal conviction about the necessity of majority-rule in Southern
Africa, and especially about the moral failure of the apartheid South African state.
Mobutu Sese Seko's motives were harder to scrutinize, but no doubt he sought to bolster
his personal power by any means, and knew that a strategic partnership with the most
powerful nation on earth was the best way to achieve this.
Less than three years after Nixon boarded the Navy One in disgrace, Kissinger
was exiting the White House as well. Jimmy Carter won the presidency, and Kissinger's
time in appointed office came to a close. His policy in Angola was roundly criticized.203

204 For much more on this, see Philip G ourevitch’s We wish to inform y ou that tom orrow we will be killed
with our fam ilies: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998).
203 An example would be John A. M arcum, "Lessons o f Angola," Foreign Affairs 54, no. 3 (1976). Despite
its moderate tone, Marcum makes clear that Angola was a major mistake, and blighted K issinger's legacy.
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America had not yet failed in Angola—which it ultimately would—but neither was Angola
a validation of the Nixon/Kissinger foreign policy strategy.
Even as Kissinger packed up his things in the White House, Julius Nyerere and
Mobutu Sese Seko were still only mid-way through their periods of power. Mobutu's
"Presidency" collapsed under violent rebellion in 1997, as retaliatory Rwandan Tutsi's
took over his deeply weakened Zaire. Mobutu had been a staunch supporter of the Hutu
regime that ultimately committed the 1994 genocide.
Julius Nyerere became one of the few from among the first generation of African
leaders to step down from office peacefully. His grand vision of ujamaa had failed in
spectacular fashion, and Tanzania was worse off economically when he left office in
1985 then when he took the presidency in late 1961.206
In the final analysis it is clear that Henry Kissinger played a large role in making
Africa a critical domain of U.S. foreign policy. The case of Angola proved to be beyond
his considerable diplomatic and martial foresight, but the continent itself, as it was
coming into its own as a collection of sovereign states, benefited in key ways from being
taken seriously by the foremost diplomat of the modem era. Kissinger's respect for
Africa's leading intellectual, Julius Nyerere, proved to be visionary, and while the
dynamics of power between the United States and the African states are still be
negotiated, Henry Kissinger fateful trip to the continent in 1976 was a watershed moment
in this complex and vitally important relationship.
This thesis is not about Henry Kissinger. Kissinger proves useful, however, as a
lens to examine the leaders of these nations through the eyes of America. The African

">06 Nyerere remained the head o f the ruling party, Chama cha Map'mdiizi until 1990.
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context of the mid-1970s cannot be studied without examining the impact of the bi-polar
Cold War on the continent. Congo in particular directly experienced the effects of an
American interventionist policy in Africa at that time as their elected leader fell in part
due to American machinations. Kissinger's utility to this thesis, then, is to challenge
American assumptions about these men: a challenge which belies over simple
conceptualizations of the men which continue to persist. Kissinger's own recollections,
challenged in this section, can be seen as proxy for the flattening and misremembering of
America's role in Africa, and to some degree the irrelevancy, in the long term, of America
to the policies of these African leaders. Both Nyerere and Mobutu influenced,
manipulated and perhaps politically bested one of the great diplomats of America's
twentieth century, and thus Kissinger's brief but complex experience of these two men
and their nations, provides a window into how these men functioned in the international
sphere, dealing with nations exponentially more wealthy and militarily mighty than their
own.
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Conclusion
The Congo River is the deepest river on the planet. 207 At its deepest, 755 feet
down, new species of marine life are being discovered. The Congo River has featured in
numerous pieces of global disseminated art, perhaps most notably Joseph Conrad’s Heart
o f Darkness, and the John Huston directed Katherine Hepburn and Humphrey Bogart
film The African Queen. The impenetrability of the Congo Rainforest, the largest outside
the Amazon, feeds into the trope that the river winds its way into literal and metaphorical
darkness— the impenetrable fortress of evil and wildness in the human heart. Particularly
in English language sources, this trope is largely intact with regard to Mobutu Sese Seko.
Written off as a troublesome dictator, M obutu’s genuine political power and regional
influence has been ignored. French-language scholars, on the other hand, have written
many worthy works on Mobutu, such as Le Dinosaure— le Zaire de Mobutu and even the
apologetic Mobutu—Dignite pour I ’A frique. 208
9

The darkness, deepness and impenetrability of the Congo could not be more
different than the character of Lake Victoria, a food source for millions, and the ever
reliable source of perhaps the world’s most important river. Nyerere, like the lake that
sheltered his home town, was deliberate, knowable and constant. He published
prolifically on his own political ideas and thoughts. He gained tremendous global respect
during his presidency, even to the point of being “one of the most prominent socialist in

207 Kyle Dickman, "Evolution in the Deepest River in the W orld | Science & Nature | Smithsonian
M agazine," History, Travel, Arts, Science, People, Places | Smithsonian M agazine,
http://w w w .sm ithsonianm ag.com /science-nature/Evolution-in-the-D eepest-River-in-the-W orldJitm l
(accessed June 03, 2010).
20X Michela W rong pointed me in this direction in the afterword to her book (327). She includes a number
of other excellent French-language texts on the man as well.
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the world and one o f the most articulate spokesmen of the poor and oppressed.”209 He
defended well his own legacy saying, “we took over a country with 85 per cent of its
adult population illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were 2
trained engineers and 12 doctors. This is the country we inherited. When I stepped down
there was 91-per-cent literacy and nearly every child was in school. We trained thousands
of engineers and doctors and teachers.”

210

In the end, despite what they achieved or did poorly, like the source of the Nile,
and highlands where the Congo River emerges from the earth, the final product of each
man had much to do with their origins. Mobutu would never have the opportunities for
study and scholarships to go abroad that Nyerere was given. Because of its vastness and
complex ethnic milieu Congo could never have engendered the peaceful transfer of
power TANU achieved in Tanzania. The British, for all their faults, ruled Tanganyika in
a way that at least gave Nyerere something to work with, in terms of administration as he
set out to develop his nation into an Ujamaa paradise. Mobutu inherited a bloody,
fragmented maelstrom. No other mechanism, other than the exertion of martial power,
would have allowed him access to the highest office in the land, especially after the
assignation of Lumumba, perhaps the only person who had the opportunity to take Congo
on a path much more like Tanzania’s.
This is not intended to make a deterministic point about Nyerere’s relative
triumphs as a leader versus M obutu’s stream of vagaries and oppressions, but rather to
suggest that ignoring the context of a situation when evaluating a leader diminishes the
209 Godfrey M wakikagile, Tanzania under Mw a limit Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesman (Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2006), 58.
210 Ikaweba Bunting, "The Heart o f Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," The New Internationalist,
January/February 1999.
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significance of how power reasonably could be achieved in a given context. Nyerere is
Nyerere in no small part because o f what Tanzania was, in addition to, of course, his own
massive influence on the nation. Congo, too, must be seen as both a product, and source,
of Mobutu Sese Seko. Men are made and make themselves, and much like the waters
from which they emerged, their legacies will long outlive the men, continuing to
influence and impact millions of lives today and into the unknowable future.
The Waters Run Down
Like the waters of Africa, there was, and is, a cyclic nature to the production of
the nation in the African context. Nyerere and Mobutu were shaped by their origins, and
by the processes by which they gained power. Once in power, however, they shaped the
nations they led. As a result the next generation of leader in the nation became a product
of the national conditions which led to their rise, largely products of the two men in
power.
It can be dangerous to draw to large a conclusion from a study with limited scope,
but in the context of Tanzania and Congo, it seems fair to say that the nation which was
the less successful colony in terms of economic exploitation fared much better politically
and in terms o f ethnic conflict than the one which still remains an object of much interest
from multinational extractive corporations. Tanzania’s “failure” to prove viable in terms
of commercial sisal agriculture or coffee production, other than in pockets of the country,
meant that Britain had less to lose in allowing it independence, and largely staying out of
its affairs as it gained independence. This opportunity was not afforded Congo, and the
UN, the United States and Belgium all exerted dramatic, intense and continued pressure
on the newly independent nation, most obviously in the assassination of its first elected
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president. This theory is well summarized in recent work by political scientist Elliot
Green:
I argue that both high amounts of capital and labour and inter-regional imbalances
in labour, land and capital can contribute to political instability and conflict.
Conversely, low amounts of capital and labour, combined with an equitable
distribution of all three factor endowments, can encourage political stability and
nation formation. 211
Contemporary analysts of Africa heap criticism on Mobutu for his obvious
corruption and repressive instincts. While Mobutu is accused of emulating the corruption
of his colonial forbearers, continued foreign involvement in the Congo adheres to the
trajectory of economic exploitation which has permeated Congo’s 20th century. The
reality o f continued exploitation suggest Mobutu can be seen as a symptom of
exploitation run amok rather than as the producer of it, per se.
Like water too, it can be difficult to grasp the nature of these complex and
powerful men in a brief introductory study such as this. Even as one closes a hand around
an aspect of these men's lives, the slippery nature of history, memory and political
ideology force the realities of Africa's nation state-building projects and their leaders
further from grasp. Future development of this research will centralize the response of
Nyerere and Mobutu to Kissinger and other American representatives as source material
becomes more available on the subject. Further versions will also move the narrative
down to the ground level more often, to demonstrate what effect these men had to people
on a day-to-day level, as access to local archives becomes more possible. Despite the
limitations of this project, this study intends to provide a starting point in examining these

211 Elliot Green, "The Political Economy o f Nation Formation in Modern Tanzania," in Proceedings o f the
A nnual M eeting o f the Am erican Political Science Association; Toronto, Septem ber 2009, proceedings of
The Annual M eeting o f the Am erican Political Science Association, University o f Toronto, 2.
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influential, important men, and the legacies they have left behind for their people and the
people of Africa.
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